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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters: two on taxation and
one on healthcare market.1
The first chapter studies the effect of marginal capital tax on
wealth accumulation to inform the current debate on optimal cap-
ital taxation. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data and tax
returns data of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), we construct individual
marginal capital income tax rates in 1983 and 1989 to study the effect of cap-
ital taxation on household wealth accumulation. The Tax Reform Act (TRA)
of 1986 induced larger tax cuts for the top income groups, and also changes
the tax rules for different capital income items. Moreover, the heterogeneous
wealth portfolio across households further feeds into the variation of marginal
capital income tax rates. Taking into account all three types of variations,
we estimate the wealth elasticity with respect to marginal capital income tax
rate in a difference-in-difference setting. Our benchmark results imply that
a 1% increase of the net-of-tax rate on capital income induces a 0.67% in-
crease of annual wealth accumulations. Our estimate carries important policy
implications for the on-going debate on optimal capital taxation.
The second chapter studies the effect of top marginal income
1. The first chapter is co-authored with Professor Zhu Shenghao and Professor Yang C.C.;
the second chapter is co-authored with Professor Zhu Shenghao and Dr. Shen Yifan; the
third chapter is co-authored with Professor Yi Junjian, Professor Yang Nan and Professor
Song Changcheng.
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tax rates on top income shares. Using Structure Vector Autoregression
with narrative series of tax reforms in the US, we find that changes in top
marginal income tax rates has significant effect on top income inequality, after
accounting for the endogeneity of tax policies and the dynamics of various
macroeconomic factors. Under one-percent increase in net-of-tax rates, the
top 1% income shares will rise by 0.08 percentage in the first year and 0.14
percentage in the second year. The marginal tax cuts for the top 1% has
significant and negative impacts on income shares of the next 9% within the
top decile and the bottom 90%. A counterfactual tax cut in marginal capital
gains tax rates will induce strong tax avoidance from the top taxpayers, but
have small and insignificant effects on real income and unemployment.
The third chapter evaluates the effect of streamlined online ap-
pointment services on hospital operations and patient choices. We
examine a mobile outpatient appointment app launched by Chinese hospi-
tals to assess the effect of information provision and streamlined appointment
booking on balancing the healthcare supply and demand. We first document
that the app increases the utilization of hospital services: total appointments
increase by 4.8%, appointment cancel rate reduces by 3.4%, and consequently,
total visits increase by 9.5%. We then show the app improves the matching
of demand to supply by facilitating patient’s sorting. (1) Patients avoid busy
days of the week and increase the weekend visits. (2) Patients substitute of-
fline appointments with online ones in big hospitals, whereas increase visits by
means of online appointments in small hospitals. (3) Patients become more
viii
likely to visit small hospitals if illness is less severe, and visit big hospitals if
more severe. Furthermore, additional app-adopter hospital shortens the av-
erage waiting time for booked appointments. Overall, our results suggest the
app not only provides convenience and flexibility to patients, but also improves
the allocation of medical demand across time and across hospitals.
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Chapter 1
Estimation of Capital Tax
Elasticity
1.1 Introduction
There is much debate in economic profession on how much tax should be levied
on capital. Traditional literature suggests zero capital tax rate due to infinitely
large elasticity of wealth with respect to the capital taxation (Chamley, 1986;
Judd, 1985), but subsequent studies have overturned the zero-tax result by
relaxing some key model assumptions, such as introducing idiosyncratic shocks
in capital returns (Benhabib et al., 2011) and different bequest motives (Farhi
and Werning, 2010).1
The debate continues in policy-makings. All advanced economies impose
some forms of capital taxes. For example, European Union raises 9% of GDP
from capital taxes, while the US raises about 8% (Piketty and Saez, 2012).
However, zero-capital-tax result remains an important reference point in policy
discussions, and many economists and policy-makers support tax competition
1. See Cremer and Pestieau (2006) and Kopczuk (2013) for excellent review of the capital
tax literature.
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as a way to impose zero capital taxes to reluctant governments (Cai and Treis-
man, 2005; Edwards and Mitchell, 2008). Piketty and Saez (2013) views this
large gap between optimal capital tax theory and policy practice as “one of
the most important failures of modern public economics.”
To fill this gap, recent studies have turned to the sufficient-statistics ap-
proach. Piketty and Saez (2013) has developed an optimal capital tax formula
that is tractable as being expressed in estimable parameters, and is robust to
the primitives of the economic models. This formula has shifted the research
focus from justifying critical model assumptions to estimating the sufficient
statistics such as distributional parameters and behavioral elasticities. It also
provides the anchor for the disarrayed policy debate in optimal capital tax-
ation. However, Piketty and Saez (2013) has not estimated the empirical
counterpart for one of their key formula parameters: the capital tax elasticity.
The subsequent literature has largely left open its estimation as well.
This paper estimates the capital tax elasticity empirically by estimating
the effect of marginal capital income tax on household wealth accumulation.
We first obtain the household wealth and capital income profile from Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), then construct the household marginal capital
income tax rates from marginal income tax rates and household capital income
profile. We estimate the capital tax elasticity using both DIDs (DID) and In-
strumental Variable (IV) methods, and take advantage of the Tax Reform Act
(TRA) of 1986 as a natural experiment. The estimated capital tax elasticity
ranges from 0.43 to 0.67, which falls into the high-end spectrum of capital tax
2
elasticity considered by Piketty and Saez (2013). It implies that a 1% increase
of the net-of-tax rate on capital income induces a 0.43% to 0.67% increase of
annual household wealth.
Our main data source is the SCF 1983/1989 panel data, which contain
detailed information on household balance sheets, financial assets, labor force
participation, demographic characteristics, and major sources of income (Ken-
nickell and Shack-Marquez, 1992; Kennickell and Starr-Mccluer, 1997). We
match the tax-related demographics and income information into the NBER
TAXSIM program to construct the household marginal income tax rate (Feen-
berg and Coutts, 1993). We then tab into the detailed tax rules for capital
income documented by the Individual Income Tax Return files of Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). Finally, we construct the household marginal capital
income tax rate by taking into account the household marginal income tax
rate, household capital income profile, and the detailed tax rules.
We apply both DID and IV methods to estimate the capital tax elasticity
in panel analysis. In DID framework, we compare the changes in household
wealth of a “treatment” group (experiencing a large tax change) to changes for
a “control” group (not experiencing the same, or any, tax change) (Slemrod,
1998; Giertz et al., 2008; Saez et al., 2012). More specifically, we are taking
advantage of the fact that the top 1% households have experienced much
larger changes in marginal tax rates in the 1986 tax reforms than the rest of
the population (Feldstein, 1995a). Comparison between the top with lower
income households will eliminate the the unobservable social and economic
3
changes that uniformly affect the wealth accumulation across the population.
In IV framework, we construct the synthetic marginal capital tax changes
by applying the post-reform tax rules to inflated pre-reform income (Auten and
Carroll, 1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002a). The synthetic marginal capital tax
rate is the rate that would have been applicable in post-reform years had the
household income not changed. By construction, the synthetic tax rates are
strongly correlated with the actual post-reform tax rates, but are exogenous
to the household behavioral response induced by the tax reform. Both our
DID and IV analyses yield similar capital tax elasticity estimates.
Our paper is related to the literature studying the effect of capital taxation
on wealth accumulation. Joulfaian (2004) provides time series evidence to
show that gifts and transfers are highly elastic with respect to gift taxes,
particularly in the short run. Poterba (2001) presents cross-sectional evidence
that wealthy households shift wealth from inheritance to inter vivos gifts in
order to avoid estate taxation. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) presents cross-
sectional evidence that reported estates are negatively correlated with estate
tax rates, but the estimate is sensitive to the set of instruments chosen to
capture the exogenous variation of tax rates. In general, the literature has
agreed that wealth accumulation is highly responsive to capital taxation, and
documented various channels of tax avoidance. However, the literature has
not come up with a fully convincing empirical strategy to estimate the capital
tax elasticity (Kopczuk, 2012).
Previous studies on capital taxation have generally focus on estate tax,
4
where the tax records are collected near one’s demise, thus denying the possi-
bility to have repeated observations of the same individual (Kopczuk, 2007).
We estimate the household’s behavioral responses to capital income tax in
panel structure. We do this by constructing the marginal tax rates on cap-
ital income from combining detailed information on household capital asset
profile and the marginal income tax rates. Moreover, we contribute to the
capital tax literature by implementing the econometric techniques from the
income tax literature, where various methods have been developed to capture
the exogenous variation of tax rates in panel frameworks (Saez et al., 2012).
Our paper also draws from the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) literature
(Feldstein, 1995a; Slemrod, 1998; Gruber and Saez, 2002a; Saez et al., 2012).
This large and growing literature estimates the elasticity of total taxable in-
come with respect to marginal income tax rates using various tax reforms as
natural experiments.2 These studies take advantage of the differential tax
changes in different income groups induced by the tax reform to achieve in-
come tax variations conditional on income level. Moreover, these studies often
employ the DID method to eliminate the factors that induce homogeneous re-
sponses but are beyond the control of individual households, such as business
cycles and demographic changes. We apply the empirical arsenals assembled
in the ETI literature to study the effect of capital taxation on wealth accumu-
2. By studying the response from total taxable income, the ETI elasticity summarizes
household’s behavior to tax change in several dimensions: (1) the joint labor supply decisions
from both earners in the household; (2) labor income shifting to other forms of compensation;
(3) different saving and investment vehicles such to delay tax payment as purchasing assets
that yield capital gains; (4) different expenditure behaviors to achieve higher deductions
such as increasing household mortgage payment.
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lation.
Despite using similar empirical strategies as in the ETI literature, our study
of wealth elasticity to the capital taxation is unique in two aspects. First, the
household wealth dynamics reflect a richer set of household behaviors in in-
come, saving, and investment. Since wealth is accumulated through capitalized
savings, the wealth dynamics not only reflect the household savings in the cur-
rent period, but reflect the combined feedbacks from the history of household
investment and saving behaviors. The household wealth dynamics provides
a parsimonious way to summarize all these households behaviors (Saez and
Zucman, 2016).
The second difference concerns with data availability, both in terms of
capital income tax rates and of household wealth. In the ETI literature, most
studies have used the IRS individual income tax return files for data of both
income and marginal income tax rates. However, few administrative data
sources for wealth or capital tax are available.3 Researchers generally study
the estate tax, or tax on specific capital income components, such as dividends
tax (Yagan, 2015), or studying the corporate behaviors in response to the
corporate income tax (Gruber and Rauh, 2007). We proposes a new method
to construct the capital income tax from the income tax returns data from
3. In the United States, property taxes are not administered at national level, but are
independently levied by states or local municipalities (Hellerstein et al., 2005). The property
tax rate varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as does the method of assessing the tax base
of the property. Therefore, we do not discuss property tax here. Estate tax is subject to
very high exemption threshold (Piketty and Saez, 2007). As a result, only a small fraction
of households are subject to estate tax. Therefore, it is difficult to study the behavioral
response to the estate tax in the panel setting. Thus we do not study the estate tax here
either.
6
published SOI tables produced by the IRS, and study the effect of the capital
income tax to wealth accumulation. Our wealth data are obtained from the
SCF.4 Details of variable construction are discussed later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses a simple
model of capital income taxation. Section 1.3 discusses the data sources and
variable construction. Section 1.4 presents our empirical methodology and
reports the empirical results. Section 1.5 presents the robustness analyses.
Section 1.6 discusses and concludes. Appendix A provides the technical details
of the construction of marginal capital income tax rates.
1.2 Simple Model
We study a stylized two-period model to illustrate the effect of the capital
taxation on saving and wealth accumulation decisions. Assume household i at
time t faces the linearized inter-temporal budget constraint:
Wi,t+1 + Ci,t = Ri,tWi,t + Yi,t
and Yi,t = Y¯i,t·(1−τi,t)+Vi,t is the total after-tax labor income, where Y¯i,t is pre-
tax labor income, τi,t is the individual marginal income tax rate and Vi,t is the
virtual income induced by the progressivity of marginal tax schedule, see for
example Saez (2001). Ri,t is the after-tax gross rate of return on wealth Wi,t.
Household resources in t are allocated into consumption Ci,t and wealth for the
next period Wi,t+1. In contrast to the ETI literature, we focus on the dynamic
4. The income capitalization approach created by Saez and Zucman (2016) provides a
new arena for future research on wealth accumulation.
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responses in the inter-temporal decision of saving and wealth accumulation,
rather than static responses such as labor supply. We assume households
supply labor inelastically, and the behavioral responses from capital taxation
are mainly induced through the channels of saving and capital accumulation.5
Assuming any time-separable utility from consumption, the household first-
order condition implies that optimal saving decisions crucially hinge on the
after-tax gross rate of return Ri,t (Benhabib et al., 2011). Denote the share
of household wealth invested into jth assets as αji,t; the before-tax net rate of
return on asset j as r¯ji,t; and the tax-exempted proportion of capital income
from asset j as βji,t.
6 The after-tax total capital income can be written as
ri,tWi,t =
∑
j
αji,tWi,t[1 + r¯
j
i,t(β
j
i,t + (1− βji,t)(1− τ ji,t))]
Households will optimally adjust their portfolio composition across asset groups
and within asset group, αji,t and β
j
i,t respectively, in order to achieve the highest
rate of return.
In terms of tax rules, capital income is aggregated with labor income into
the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), which is subject to progressive tax schedule.
This implies marginal tax rates are homogeneous across all capital income, and
are equal to the marginal individual income tax rate, i.e. τ ji,t = τi,t for all j. To
bring this simple model to data, we rewrite the after-tax total capital income
5. Piketty and Saez (2013) endogenizes elastic labor-supply decision and derives the op-
timal capital tax formula taking into account the behavioral responses in labor supply.
6. For example, in 1982, 60% of long term capital gains were tax-exempted and interest
from all sources were taxed uniformly. However, in 1988, long term capital gains were fully
taxable but interest from state and municipal bonds were tax-exempted.
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as
ri,tWi,t = r¯i,tWi,t · [1−
∑
j
ρji,t(1− βji,t)τi,t]
where r¯i,tWi,t =
∑
j α
j
i,tr
j
i,tWi,t is the pre-tax total capital income reported in
individual tax return, and ρji,t =
αji,tr
j
i,tWi,t
r¯i,tWi,t
is the share of the capital income
from asset j in terms of total capital income. The marginal capital income tax
is then ∑
j
ρji,t(1− βji,t)τi,t (1.1)
In our empirical analysis, we follow Piketty and Saez (2003a) to define
capital income into four income categories: interests, dividends, rents and
royalties, and capital gains. The marginal capital income tax rate consists of
two parts: the marginal income tax rate τi,t, and an capital income adjustment
term
∑
j ρ
j
i,t(1−βji,t). We compute the marginal income tax rate τi,t and capital
income shares ρji,t at household level. We compute the exemption shares β
j
i,t
at income bracket level by matching household income into the IRS income
brackets.7 We do so because we do not have sufficient information to obtain
the exemption shares at household-level in SCF.
While most ETI literature focuses on the marginal income tax rate, we
argue that the adjustment term also captures a rich set of behavioral responses
that any tax reform may induce. First, when tax reform leads to a change of
rates of return on different assets, households may readjust their portfolio
7. Note in the US tax system, dividends, interests and rents are generally taxed at ordinary
income tax rate, but under different exemption rules. Capital gains are taxed at more
favorable rate. In our construction of capital income tax, we have adjusted for different
exemptions. We further adjust dividend tax by the corporate income tax. See Appendix A
for details.
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composition. The optimal readjustment in portfolio share αji,t is reflected by
the capital return share ρji,t. For example, Alan et al. (2010) have documented
a significant effect of capital income taxation on portfolio composition.
Second, when tax reforms modified the exemption rule for certain types of
capital income, households may readjust their investment share within each
asset group, for instance investing more heavily in tax-exempted capital asset
(Saez et al., 2012). This within-group adjustment is relevant for our study,
because the 1986 tax reform has changed the tax-exemption rules within some
asset groups. We capture the within-group adjustment behavior by the tax-
exempted share βji,t.
Overall, we have built a simple two-period model to show how the house-
hold may optimally allocate wealth into different asset groups, and how house-
hold may adjust their portfolio inter-temporally in response to changes in tax
rules. We next describe our main data sources.
1.3 Data
In this section, we discuss our main data source, define the key variables,
especially how we construct the marginal capital income tax rate, and present
the summary statistics.
1.3.1 Data Sources
Our main data source is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1983/1989
panel dataset. The SCF collects detailed information on households’ assets,
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liabilities, income and other characteristics, and is specially designed to over-
sample the rich households (Kennickell and Shack-Marquez, 1992; Kennickell
and Starr-Mccluer, 1997). See Appendix A for more detailed discussion of
SCF and its survey methodology.
Our empirical analysis focus on two years, 1983 and 1989. The selection is
made for two reasons. First, the SCF is conducted every three years as a cross-
sectional survey, and only the 1983-1989 form a panel structure. Therefore, our
empirical estimation are based on these two years. The SCF records income
information from the previous year, so the 1983 marginal capital income tax
rate is obtained from matching the 1982 household income into match into the
1982 IRS income tax statistics. The 1989 marginal capital income tax rate is
obtained in the same way.
Second, the year 1983 and 1989 cover one of the most important tax over-
haul in the modern U.S. history: the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The fortuitous
fielding of the SCF before and after the 1986 tax reform makes it particularly
useful to study the effect of tax changes on capital and wealth dynamics. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 has introduced a proportionally larger cut in capital
income tax rates for the top income households and a relatively smaller cut
for the lower income households.8
The SCF 1983-1989 panel contains households who were interviewed in
8. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is not the only tax reform that induces different tax
burden changes depending on income levels. Saez et al. (2012) has documented that during
the last three decades in the United States, the largest absolute change in tax rates has
fallen onto the top income groups, with much smaller impact on the middle and lower
income groups.
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both 1983 and 1989.9 We exclude the households with AGI less than 1,000
dollars in both years. We further restrict the sample to include only the
upper half of the income distribution. The income percentile thresholds are
obtained from Piketty and Saez (2003a). Our benchmark sample totals 3,020
observations in two waves of data. We compute the household wealth and
income for both 1983 and 1989, and use the Consumer Price Index to inflate
all 1983 money terms to 1989 value to ensure comparability across years.
We also utilize the IRS income tax statistics of 1982 and 1988 as supple-
mentary data source. The IRS Individual Income Tax Return files tabulate the
income tax returns into a large number of income brackets and break down the
total income into detailed income components. This enables us to calculate
the exemption rules for each of the major capital income components in each
income bracket. Moreover, IRS Individual Income Tax Return files also inform
all the administrative details of the tax rules in 1983 and 1989, which we base
on to construct tax-related variables. See Appendix A for further discussion.
1.3.2 Defining Income and Wealth
We follow IRS to define income as the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), including:
(1) wages and salaries, (2) professional practice, business and farm, (3) non-
taxable investment, (4) interest income, (5) dividends, (6) net capital gains,
(7) rent, trust, and royalty, (8) worker’s and unemployment compensation, (9)
9. Each households data are repeated three times with different random draws of imputed
variables. The multiple imputations are applied by SCF to more accurately represent the
variance of the imputed variables. Thus the standard errors in our analysis must be corrected
for the presence of imputations. We follow Dynan et al. (2004) to multiply the standard
errors by 1.73, i.e., the square root of the number of imputations (three).
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child support, alimony, inheritance, gifts and financial support, (10) welfare
and public assistance, (11) retirement, annuity, pension, disability, survivor
and benefits, (12) other income. We follow Piketty and Saez (2003a) to define
capital income as the sum of four income categories: interests, dividends, rents
and royalties, and capital gains.
Wealth is defined as total value of household assets net of liabilities. We
follow Wolff (2014) to define total assets as the sum of: (1) the gross value of
owner-occupied housing; (2) other real estate owned by the household; (3) the
gross value of vehicles; (4) cash and demand deposits; (5) time and savings
deposits, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts; (6) government
bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other financial securities; (7) the
cash surrender value of life insurance plans; (8) the cash surrender value of
pension plans, including IRAs and Keogh plans; (9) corporate stock, including
mutual funds; (10) net equity in unincorporated businesses; and (11) equity in
trust funds. Total liabilities are defined as the sum of mortgage debt, consumer
debt, and other debts.
All the detailed income and wealth items are provided by the SCF data.
Other variables include demographic informations such as age, gender and race
of head of household, and household structures.
1.3.3 Constructing Marginal Capital Income Tax
Our construction takes three steps. First, we calculate the marginal tax rates
on each of the major capital income categories (interests, dividends, rents
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and capital gains) from the IRS income tax returns data. Different capital
income categories are subject to different exemption rules, and only the taxable
proportions are aggregated into the adjusted gross income to be taxed at
the marginal statutory rate. To ensure a consistent tax base definition, we
construct marginal tax rates for different capital income categories to be based
on the before-exemption value. For example, 60% of long term capital gains
are tax-exempted before the 1986 reform, thus our constructed marginal tax
on long term capital gains is 40% of the marginal statutory rate in 1983. In
doing so, we ensure the constructed tax rates are comparable before and after
the 1986 tax reform. In other words, we ensure that the 1986 tax reform
induces no changes in the capital income tax base definition, but only changes
in marginal rates.
Second, since the IRS income tax returns tabulate individual returns into
a large number of income brackets and decomposes total income into detailed
income categories, we calculate the share of each capital income categories in
terms of the total capital income in each income bracket. We use this share
to construct the marginal capital income tax rate as the weighted average of
marginal rates on each of the major capital income categories.10 Since the
marginal rate is higher in higher income brackets, the constructed marginal
capital income tax rate also inherit this progressivity. Moreover, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 has introduced larger tax cuts in marginal capital income
10. We essentially assume all the taxpayers in the same income bracket have the same
capital income shares in interests, dividends, rents and capital gains. See later sections for
a discussion of this assumption.
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tax rates for the higher income brackets (see Table 1.1), which opens up the
opportunity of a DID estimation.
Last, we match the household income and tax-related demographics infor-
mation into the NBER TAXSIM program to obtain the household’s AGI and
marginal income tax rate. We then match household AGI into the brackets
of IRS income tax returns table to obtain the bracket-specific tax-exemption
shares for different categories of capital income. Finally, we combine household
marginal income tax rate and capital income profile to construct the household
marginal capital income tax rate using Equation 1.1.
We construct the synthetic marginal capital income tax rate in similar fash-
ion as Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002a). We first inflate
the pre-reform income into post-reform tax schedule to obtain the synthetic
1989 marginal income tax rate. More specifically, we put the CPI-inflated 1983
income and tax-related demographic information into the NBER TAXSIM pro-
gram for 1989 tax year. Then, we combine the synthetic 1989 marginal income
tax rate τi,t with the 1983 household capital income shares ρ
j
i,t and 1983 capi-
tal income exemption shares βji,t to obtain the synthetic 1989 marginal capital
income tax rate using Equation 1.1. Overall, this gives us the hypothetical
post-reform tax rate assuming no behavioral response from the household.
The difference between the synthetic 1989 rate and actual 1983 rate then cap-
tures only the exogenous changes in tax rules from the 1986 reform, and is
independent from individual unobservable behavioral changes.
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1.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics. The top income status is defined
consistently using 1983 income. In the first row, we document the mean log
household wealth for the top 1% versus the next 9% (Panel A), top 1% versus
the next 49% (Panel B) and top 10% versus next 40% (Panel C) in both 1983
and 1989. From 1983 to 1989, the wealth gap between the top 1% and top 9%
narrowed a little, with the log difference dropped from 2.64 to 2.47. However,
the wealth gap between the top 1% and the next 49% and between the top
10% and the next 40% have increased significantly, with log difference rose
from 3.29 to 3.61 and from 2.70 to 3.12 respectively.
Note we define the household ranking by income percentiles defined by
Piketty and Saez (2003b). For example, we assign top 1% status to a house-
hold if the household income exceeds the top 1% income threshold defined
by Piketty and Saez (2003b). We rank by income instead of wealth because
the marginal income tax rates and bracket-specific exemption shares are all
defined by income (see Equation 1.1 and Section 1.3). Using the same panel
dataset, Kennickell and Starr-Mccluer (1997) rank households by wealth and
find a similar pattern: from 1983 to 1989, the top 1% households saw their
share of total wealth decline.
The second and third row of Table 1.1 present our constructed marginal
capital tax rates and synthetic capital tax rates. The two marginal tax rates
are the same in 1983, but differs in 1989 as the synthetic tax rate is determined
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by applying the post-reform tax rule to the inflated pre-reform income. In both
tax rates, it is clear that the 1986 Tax Reform Act has introduced a larger tax
cut for the top income groups across all three comparison pairs. For example,
the marginal capital income tax rate for the top 1% households has decreased
from 0.497 to 0.326 after the 1986 tax reform, which implies a 34% increase
in the net-of-tax rate. The marginal rate for the next 9% has decreased from
0.432 to 0.307, a 22% increase in the net-of-tax rate. The marginal rate for
the 50th to 90th percentile households has decreased from 0.336 to 0.261, only
an 11% increase in the net-of-tax rate.
The rest of the rows summarize the demographic variables. Comparison of
demographic characteristics between the top and lower income groups leave no
surprise: the top groups were older, more likely to be married, had more edu-
cation, less like to be minority, and had fewer dependent children. Intuitively,
all these demographic characteristics suggest that the top income group should
experience faster wealth growth. We now turn to the regression analysis.
1.4 Methodology and Results
Denote yit as the total household wealth of household i at year t , τit as marginal
capital income tax rate, and Xit as the vector of household characteristics. The
regression equation is written as:
log(yit) = e · log(1− τit) + βXit + it
where coefficient e is the wealth elasticity with respect to net-of-tax rate.
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1.4.1 Panel DID
As discussed earlier, the constructed marginal capital income tax rate is pro-
gressive with respect to income brackets, it will also be correlated with the
household wealth level. Households who anticipate an increase in marginal
tax rate in the next year will adjust their capital investment portfolio, such
as shifting capital into different forms and strategically timing the profit real-
ization, in order to lower the expected tax liability. Due to these behavioral
responses, marginal tax rate is endogenous and simple OLS estimate will be
biased.
We resolve the endogeneity problem using the DID design. Based on the
1983 income, we sort households into three treatment-control pairs: the top
1% (percentile 99 above) versus the next 9% (percentile 90 to percentile 99),
the top 1% (percentile 99 above) versus the next 49% (percentile 50 to per-
centile 99), and the top 10% (percentile 90 above) versus the next 40% (per-
centile 50 to percentile 90). The income percentile thresholds are obtained from
Piketty and Saez (2003a). The 1986 tax reform created much larger changes
in marginal tax rates for top income households than the rest of population
(Feldstein, 1995a).
Previous empirical studies have documented that the behavioral response
to changes in marginal tax rates is concentrated in the top of the income
distribution, with less evidence of any response for the middle and lower income
class. Moreover, because the middle or lower income class generally do not
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have much taxable capital income, individual capital income tax liabilities are
very skewed. Therefore, it is useful to focus on the analysis of the effects of
changing the marginal tax rate on the upper end of the income distribution.
We follow Saez et al. (2012) to first difference the variables and estimate
the the following 2SLS regression using the top-income group dummy as in-
strument:
log(
yit+1
yit
) = e · log(1− τit+1
1− τit ) + βdXit + vit (1.2)
where dXit denotes the first-differenced time-varying demographic controls.
Time-invariant controls, such as schooling years and racial dummies, are elim-
inated by the first differencing. With only two periods, this specification is
equivalent to standard panel DID with individual fixed effect. The capital tax
elasticity is estimated by
e =
E(log
yi,89
yi,83
|T )− E(log yi,89
yi,83
|C)
E(log
1−τi,89
1−τi,83 |T )− E(log
1−τi,89
1−τi,83 |C)
The tradition of using panel data to study the effect of income taxation
on household behaviors starts with Feldstein (1995a). The panel structure
ensures we study the behavioral responses from the same set of households
across the reform period. This ameliorates the selection bias due to change of
treatment group that plagues many cross-sectional analysis in ETI literature
(Saez et al., 2012).
Table 1.2 reports the panel DID estimation results. In Column (1), we have
not included any covariants. The estimated capital tax elasticity is 2.8 and
highly statistically significant. After including additional controls in Column
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(2) and (3), the estimated elasticity is consistently estimated at around 2.7.
Control variables in Column (3) deliver expected effects. The life-cycle pattern
of wealth accumulation remains strong, as older households gain significantly
faster wealth growth rate than the 20 to 30 year old benchmark group. Mar-
riage also plays important roles in wealth accumulation, as married households
accumulate wealth 40 percent faster than the single counterparts. However,
the number of dependent children now has a negative effect on household
wealth accumulation, which supports the intuition that children under 18 will
require more investment in education and health from their parents.
The first stage results are also presented at the bottom of Table 1.2. The
top 1% households experienced a larger increase in net of marginal tax rate,
or equivalently, larger reduction in marginal tax rate, than the next 9% house-
holds. This confirms that the 1986 tax reform has created much larger tax cut
for the top income group than the lower income groups.
Table 1.3 reports the estimated capital tax elasticity across different treatment-
control comparisons. Column (1) repeats the regression of Table 1.2 Column
(3) and shows the comparison between top 1% and next 9% households. Col-
umn (2) compares the top 1% and the next 49%, and Column (3) compares
the top 10% and the next 40%. The estimated elasticities range from 2.3 to
2.7, and remain highly statistically significant across all specifications. Over-
all, the larger tax cut for top income groups created by the 1986 reform has
induced strong positive effects on wealth accumulation of the top households,
and the elasticity of capital tax is consistently above 2.
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1.4.2 Panel IV
To complement the panel DID results, we also conduct a panel IV regression.
We follow Gruber and Saez (2002a) to use synthetic changes of tax rates,
log(
1−τpit+1
1−τit ), as IV for the actual changes, log(
1−τit+1
1−τit ), to capture the exogenous
changes induced by the tax reform. The synthetic tax change is frequently used
in ETI literature, see Badel et al. (2014) for the recent application.
In the pre-reform year, the synthetic tax rate equals to the actual marginal
tax rate. We then inflate the pre-reform income into the post-reform years us-
ing constant CPI, and apply the post-reform tax law to compute the marginal
tax rate in the post-reform year. More specifically, to construct the synthetic
(actual) marginal capital tax rate, we match the inflated pre-reform income
(actual post-reform income) into the post-reform income bracket to derive the
marginal tax rate. By construction, we shut down the channel where any en-
dogenous household behaviors induced by the tax reform will affect the tax
rate the households are subject to in the post-reform years. Thus any change
of the synthetic capital tax rate should be induced only by the tax reform, and
the instrument will be exogenous to the error term.
Table 1.4 produces similar results as the panel DID regression. Column
(1) restricts the sample to the top 1% households. Column (2) restricts the
sample to the top 10% households, and Column (3) the top 50% households.
The estimated elasticities are around 2.5, and are robust across specifications.
The first-stage results show that the synthetic tax changes are highly correlated
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with the actual changes.
1.5 Robustness Checks
1.5.1 Controlling Base-Year Income
One troubling issue in the panel analysis is the potential mean reversion of
income. The problem is that if an individual or household has experienced an
unexpected negative income shocks in the pre-reform years, the post-reform
income is very likely to bounce back in the absence of any tax reform. How-
ever, since the treatment status is assigned based on pre-reform income and
kept unchanged throughout the post-reform years, the panel analysis without
controlling for the previous income will produce a spuriously large elasticity
to income tax following a major income tax cut.
The standard procedure to deal with this problem is to add base-year in-
come controls. In our framework, mean reversion is less likely to seriously
sway our estimate of wealth elasticity, because the wealth accumulation is in-
trinsically a much more stable process than income. Since the major stream
of capital return is in the form of appreciation in stocks and real estate, all
of which are less subject to shocks at household level, the wealth accumula-
tion should be stable for each household. Moreover, since our pre-reform and
post-reform are six years apart, much of the year-to-year variation of wealth
growth rate are smoothed after six years. To lessen the concern of mean rever-
sion in our results, we conduct robustness checks with pre-reform income in
Table 1.5 (DID) and Table 1.6 (IV). In both tables, the estimated capital tax
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elasticity is robust and the coefficients before the lagged log wealth are small
and insignificant.
1.5.2 Different Subsample
In this section, we conduct robustness checks using subsamples in Table 1.7
(DID) and Table 1.8 (IV). In both tables, Panel A reports results with the
subsample of households with household head aged between 30 to 60. We
exclude households younger than 30 years old because these households are
more likely to be freshly graduated from college, freshly into the labor market,
newly wed, and are thus subject to more idiosyncratic shocks in their household
wealth formation. We also exclude households older than 60 years old because
these households are on the verge of retirement and are about to change their
income and saving patterns dramatically.
Panel B reports results with the subsample of only the married couples
who remain married with the same spouse in both 1983 and 1989. We select
this subsample because any change to the marital structure, such as divorce,
new marriage or demise of the spouse, tend to have dramatic and idiosyn-
cratic effect on household wealth accumulation. After excluding the households
that have gone through changes to marital structure, the estimated elasticities
across the board remain quantitatively similar to our benchmark results. The
estimated elasticities in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 are quantitatively similar to
our benchmark results.
23
1.5.3 Alternative Instrumental Variables
We also conduct robustness checks using additional instrumental variables in
Table 1.9. The alternative instruments is inspired by Feldstein (1995a). To
estimate the income elasticity to marginal tax rate, Feldstein (1995a) has con-
structed a dummy variable indicating whether the base-year marginal income
tax rate is high, middle range or low. Then the high tax dummy is used as the
instrument for the change of marginal tax rates induced by the 1986 tax re-
form in the panel regression. Since the households who are paying the highest
tax rates are essentially the top income households, the high tax dummy is an
alternative representation of our top income treatment dummy (correlation of
0.62).
Following Feldstein (1995a), we construct a dummy variable indicating
whether the households are paying very high capital tax rates in the pre-
reform year. The IV results based on this high tax rate dummy are reported
in Columns (1) to (3) in Table 1.9. The estimated elasticities remain quan-
titatively similar to our benchmark results. In Table 1.9 Columns (4) to (6),
we include both the high tax rate dummy and the synthetic tax rates as in-
struments and rerun the IV estimation. Moreover, we report the Sargan’s
statistics and corresponding p-values for overidentification tests. The overi-
dentification tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that one of the instruments
is endogenous.
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1.5.4 Elasticity of Different Wealth Components
So far we have studied the effect of capital taxation on household aggregate
wealth. The elasticity thus incorporates the behavioral response due to capital
shifting across different capital assets. However, studying the elasticity of
different wealth component may bear interest of its own. We are interested
in exploring how households shift wealth across different capital assets. We
separately estimate the elasticity of total asset and total liability, and major
asset and liability categories in Table Table 1.10 (DID) and Table 1.11 (IV).
We estimate the capital tax elasticity of different assets: total assets in
Column (1), total value of stocks and bonds in Column (2), total value of real
estates in Column (3), total value of pensions in Column (4). The elasticity
of capital liabilities is reported in Column (5), and elasticity of the dominant
liability category, mortgage debt, is reported in Column (6).
All the major assets are highly responsive to the change of capital tax
rates. For the top income households, real estate is most responsive asset
to the change of tax rates: the value of total real estates increases by 4 to
5 percent for every percent increase in net-of-tax rates. Additionally, the
mortgage debts also reduces dramatically after 1986 tax cuts. Since mortgage
debts were the most dominant form of household liability, it implies most of
the debt reduction comes in the form of mortgage pay-down. For lower income
households, real estate becomes less responsive. This is consistent with the
finding of Poterba (1992), who finds the 1986 tax reform disproportionally
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benefits the higher income households.
1.6 Conclusion
We estimate the wealth elasticity to net of marginal capital tax rate using
the 1983-1989 SCF panel dataset. Our DID identification takes advantage of
the differential tax cuts across different income groups, and before and after
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Feldstein, 1995a; Slemrod, 1998). We group the
the sample households into three treatment-control comparison groups: (1)
top 1% versus next 9%, (2) top 1% versus next 49%, and (3) top 10% and
next 40%. The panel DID regression estimates the wealth elasticity to net of
marginal capital tax rate to range from 2 to 3.
We supplement our analysis with IV estimations. We construct the syn-
thetic change of marginal tax rates as instrument, inspired by Auten and Car-
roll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002a). The instrument is constructed based
on the exogenous changes of tax rules introduced by the 1986 tax reform, and is
independent from household endogenous behaviors. The elasticities estimated
from these IV regressions are around 2. We also conduct robustness analy-
ses using instruments inspired by Feldstein (1995a) and Moffitt and Wilhelm
(1998). The results are robust in various robustness analyses.
Overall, the estimated wealth elasticity to net-of-tax rate on capital income
is around 2, implying that a 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate will bring about
0.67% annual increase in household wealth.
Our analysis carries important policy implications. In general, policy mak-
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ers worry about capital elasticity are too large and capital adjustment happens
too quickly following tax changes through. For instance, capital flights in re-
sponsive to withholding tax on overseas capital (Johannesen, 2014). Company
adjusts dividend payouts in responsive to dividend taxation for the sake of
their shareholders (Chetty and Saez, 2005). We provide the empirical es-
timate of the capital tax elasticity to inform the debate in optimal capital
taxation. This elasticity also fills the blank in Piketty and Saez (2013)’s opti-
mal capital tax formula, which bridges the gap between economic theory and
the policy debate. We fill in this elasticity into the Piketty and Saez (2013)’s
optimal capital tax formula and obtain the optimal inheritance tax rate to
maximize for the bottom 50% households to be 42%. See details of calibration
in Table 1.12.
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TABLE 1.1
Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1983 Year 1989
VARIABLES Top 1% Next
9%
Next
40%
Top 1% Next
9%
Next
40%
Log Wealth 14.337 11.705 10.844 15.012 12.460 11.560
Marginal Rate 0.416 0.416 0.284 0.258 0.248 0.200
Synthetic Rate 0.416 0.416 0.284 0.261 0.265 0.191
Age between 30 and 40 0.088 0.248 0.255 0.013 0.087 0.153
Age between 40 and 50 0.227 0.341 0.229 0.160 0.277 0.258
Age between 50 and 60 0.300 0.215 0.210 0.231 0.314 0.250
Age above 60 0.382 0.153 0.197 0.596 0.322 0.334
Married 0.876 0.792 0.683 0.886 0.729 0.672
# of Children under 18 0.506 0.725 0.760 0.329 0.477 0.570
Observations 1190 745 1085 1190 745 1085
Notes: Income percentile are defined according to 1983 income.
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TABLE 1.2
Panel DID: Comparing Top 1% vs Next 9%
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% vs. Next
9%
Top 1% vs. Next
9%
Top 1% vs. Next
9%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Net of tax rate 2.817*** 2.826*** 2.683***
(0.171) (0.172) (0.300)
Log wage 0.007* 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Age between 30 and 40 0.029
(0.231)
Age between 40 and 50 0.245
(0.287)
Age between 50 and 60 0.357*
(0.342)
Age above 60 0.359
(0.413)
Married 0.201**
(0.146)
# of children under 18 0.011
(0.083)
Observations 1,935 1,935 1,935
R-squared 0.331 0.332 0.343
First Stage
Dummy top 1% 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.166***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 1,935 1,935 1,935
R-squared 0.542 0.543 0.730
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Treatment group is the top 1% households, control group is the next 9% house-
holds. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.3
Panel DID: Comparison Along Income Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% vs. Next
9%
Top 1% vs. Next
49%
Top 10% vs. Next
40%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Net of tax rate 2.683*** 2.472*** 2.305***
(0.300) (0.278) (0.224)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,935 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.343 0.294 0.298
First Stage
Top group dummy 0.166*** 0.174*** 0.207***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,935 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.730 0.668 0.826
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Treatment group in Column (1) is the top 1% households, control group in Column
(1) is the next 9% households. Treatment and control are the top 1% and the next 49%
households in Column (2), and top 10% and the next 40% households in Column (3). Ad-
ditional controls include log wage and demographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table
1.2. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.4
Panel IV: Synthetic Tax Rates as Instrument
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Top 10% Top 50%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Net of tax rate 2.538*** 2.467*** 2.402***
(0.229) (0.204) (0.200)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,190 1,935 3,020
R-squared 0.396 0.349 0.296
First Stage
Synthetic tax rate 0.993*** 1.024*** 1.018***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,190 1,935 3,020
R-squared 0.974 0.961 0.906
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Column (1) to (3) use synthetic net of tax rate as instrument. Sample is the top
1% households in Column (1), top 10% households in Column (2), and top 50% households
in Column (3). Additional controls include log wage and demographic controls, same as
Column (3) in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.5
Panel DID: Robustness with Base-Year Income Control
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% vs. Next 9% Top 1% vs. Next
49%
Top 10% vs. Next
40%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Net of tax rate 2.015*** 1.568*** 1.374***
(0.567) (0.443) (0.321)
Log 1983 Income 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.036***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,935 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.370 0.334 0.338
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Treatment group in Column (1) is the top 1% households, control group in Col-
umn (1) is the next 9% households. Treatment and control are the top 1% and the next
49% households in Column (2), and top 10% and the next 40% households in Column (3).
Additional controls include demographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table 1.2. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.6
Panel IV: Robustness with Base-Year Income Control
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Top 10% Top 50%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Net of tax rate 1.822*** 1.650*** 1.271***
(0.300) (0.267) (0.258)
Log 1983 Income 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,190 1,935 3,020
R-squared 0.419 0.379 0.340
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Column (1) to (3) use synthetic net of tax rate as instrument. Sample is the top
1% households in Column (1), top 10% households in Column (2), and top 50% households
in Column (3). Additional controls include demographic controls, same as Column (3) in
Table 1.2. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.7
Panel DID: Robustness with Subsamples
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% vs. Next 9% Top 1% vs. Next
49%
Top 10% vs. Next
40%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Panel A: Subsample with age between 30 and 60
Net of tax rate 3.220*** 2.149*** 1.737***
(1.293) (0.709) (0.467)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,331 2,084 2,084
R-squared 0.380 0.348 0.358
Panel B: Subsample with the same husband and wife
Net of tax rate 2.134*** 1.852*** 1.783***
(0.539) (0.433) (0.339)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,613 2,462 2,462
R-squared 0.438 0.368 0.370
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Treatment group in Column (1) is the top 1% households, control group in Column
(1) is the next 9% households. Treatment and control are the top 1% and the next 49%
households in Column (2), and top 10% and the next 40% households in Column (3). Ad-
ditional controls include log wage and demographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table
1.2. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.8
Panel IV: Robustness with Subsamples
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Top 10% Top 50%
VARIABLES Log Wealth Log Wealth Log Wealth
Panel A: Subsample with age between 30 and 60
Net of tax rate 2.761*** 2.275*** 1.752***
(0.463) (0.438) (0.384)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 732 1,331 2,084
R-squared 0.490 0.405 0.357
Panel B: Subsample with the same husband and wife
Net of tax rate 1.872*** 1.768*** 1.457***
(0.327) (0.287) (0.277)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,014 1,613 2,462
R-squared 0.454 0.446 0.376
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Column (1) to (3) use synthetic net of tax rate as instrument. Sample is the top
1% households in Column (1), top 10% households in Column (2), and top 50% households
in Column (3). Additional controls include log wage and demographic controls, same as
Column (3) in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.9
Panel IV: Robustness with Alternative Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
top 1% top 10% top 50% top 1% top 10% top 50%
VARIABLES Log
Wealth
Log
Wealth
Log
Wealth
Log
Wealth
Log
Wealth
Log
Wealth
Net of tax rate 2.650*** 2.359*** 2.196*** 2.570*** 2.451*** 2.383***
(0.232) (0.258) (0.253) (0.228) (0.209) (0.218)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,190 1,935 3,020 1,190 1,935 3,020
R-squared 0.394 0.351 0.300 0.395 0.349 0.296
Sargan’s statistic 1.447 0.597 0.043
P-value 0.229 0.440 0.837
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Columns (1) to (3) use high tax dummy from Feldstein (1995a) as instrument;
Columns (4) to (6) use both high tax dummy and synthetic tax rates as instruments. Ad-
ditional controls include log wage and demographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table
1.2. Overidentification test statistics are reported after estimates in Columns (4) to (6).
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.10
Panel DID: Tax Elasticity with Assets and Debts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Total
Assets
Stocks &
Bonds
Real
Estate
Pension Total
Liability
Mortgage
Panel A: Top 1% vs. Next 9%
Net of tax rate 2.656*** 1.778*** 5.480*** 2.411*** -8.464*** -8.901***
(0.262) (0.510) (2.088) (1.451) (1.914) (1.910)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935
R-squared 0.360 0.139 0.045 0.180 0.044 0.031
Panel B: Top 1% vs. Next 49%
Net of tax rate 2.453*** 2.023*** 5.580*** 2.440*** -7.708*** -7.787***
(0.247) (0.482) (1.882) (1.304) (1.721) (1.725)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.303 0.110 0.031 0.170 0.041 0.041
Panel C: Top 10% vs. Next 40%
Net of tax rate 2.177*** 2.306*** 3.996*** 4.170*** -6.075*** -5.101***
(0.194) (0.446) (1.334) (0.983) (1.198) (1.230)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.311 0.107 0.038 0.175 0.051 0.053
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Dependent variables are in log terms. Treatment and control are the top 1% and
the next 9% households in Panel A; the top 1% and the next 49% households in Panel B,
and top 10% and the next 40% households in Panel C. Additional controls include log wage
and demographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors in
parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.11
Panel IV: Tax Elasticity with Assets and Debts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Total
Assets
Stocks &
Bonds
Real
Estate
Pension Total
Liability
Mortgage
Panel A: Top 1%
Net of tax rate 2.451*** 2.093*** 3.780*** 3.211*** -7.047*** -6.883***
(0.197) (0.437) (1.630) (1.169) (1.594) (1.570)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190
R-squared 0.418 0.154 0.080 0.144 0.073 0.076
Panel B: Top 10%
Net of tax rate 2.313*** 2.058*** 3.558*** 4.406*** -5.705*** -5.299***
(0.176) (0.408) (1.319) (0.952) (1.249) (1.254)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935
R-squared 0.372 0.136 0.052 0.185 0.057 0.049
Panel C: Top 50%
Net of tax rate 2.195*** 2.312*** 3.746*** 5.009*** -5.359*** -4.659***
(0.172) (0.405) (1.154) (0.870) (1.067) (1.103)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020 3,020
R-squared 0.311 0.107 0.039 0.174 0.053 0.053
Notes: All variables are first differenced. Income percentile are defined according to 1983
income. Dependent variables are in log terms. All IV regressions use synthetic net of tax
rate as instrument. Sample is the top 1% households in Panel A, top 10% households in
Panel B, and top 50% households in Panel C. Additional controls include log wage and de-
mographic controls, same as Column (3) in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.12
Optimal Inheritance Tax Rate Calibrations
Basic Specification
P0-50 42.18%
P50-70 41.87%
P70-90 25.24%
P90-95 -142.72%
Sensitivity to capitalization factor R/G = e(r−g)H
r − g = 0% (R/G=1) or dynamic efficiency 27.63%
r − g = 3% (R/G=2.46) 46.77%
Sensitivity to bequests motives n
n = 1 (100% bequest motives) 34.60%
n = 0 (no bequest motives) 59.88%
Sensitivity to labor income elasticity eL
eL=0 40.52%
eL=0.5 44.67%
Optimal rate above exemption amount for P0-50
Exemption amount: 500,000 38.65%
Exemption amount: 1,000,000 37.48%
Notes: This table is adapted from Piketty and Saez (2013)’s Table 1, calibrated using their
sufficient-statistics formula in Equation (17). Basic Specification in the top panel has the
following specification: capital tax elasticity eB = 0.67, capitalization factor r − g = 2%,
bequest motive parameter n = 70%, labor income elasticity eL = 0.2, labor income tax rate
τL = 30%, and no exemption for inheritance tax (linear tax). Additional distributional pa-
rameters are obtained from the survey data (SCF 2010).
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Chapter 2
Marginal Income Tax and
Income Inequality: A Narrative
Approach
2.1 Introduction
The debate about rising income inequality in the United States has tradi-
tionally focused on the wage dispersion and college premium, attributed to
skill-biased technological change and to globalization (Katz et al., 1999). In
recent years, there has been a growing realization that most of the action has
been at the very top of income distribution. Piketty and Saez (2003b) doc-
ument that the income share of the top 1% has more than doubled from 8
percent in 1975 to 18.8 percent in 2012. Moreover, the rise in the top income
share has had a substantial effect on overall income inequality in the United
States (Atkinson et al., 2011). The sharp rise in top income inequality has
attracted a great deal of public attention and represented a big question mark
for the economics profession.
Conventional explanations are insufficient to explain the rising top income
40
shares. Comparison with other high-income countries reveals that, though ex-
periencing similar technological progress and burgeoning trade volumes, many
high-income countries have exhibited different patterns of income inequality
at the very top (Alvaredo et al., 2013). Attention has been refocused on the
other culprit for the rising income inequality: taxation.
This study presents time series evidence on how top income shares respond
to changes in marginal income tax rates. In particular, we combine existing
macro methodologies with the reported income measures of Piketty and Saez
(2003b) and World Income and Wealth Database, the marginal income tax
series constructed by Mertens (2015), and our newly constructed series on
marginal capital gains tax rates. We use the narrative measures of unantici-
pated and exogenous tax changes constructed by Romer and Romer (2009) as
proxies for tax rate innovations in structural vector autoregressions, same as
in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Mertens (2015).
We analyze the impact of a counterfactual tax reform cutting marginal tax
rates only for the top 1% in the income distribution. One percent increase in
net-of-tax rates for the top 1% taxpayers raises top 1% income shares by 0.08
and 0.14 percentage point in the first two years, but have strong negative effect
on the next 9% in the top decile. The estimated effects on total income and real
GDP are positive and in similar magnitude as estimated in Mertens (2015). In
particular, a counterfactual tax experiment replicating the exogenous tax cuts
from the 1986 tax reform explains more than three quarters of actual changes
in top 1% income shares from 1987 to 1989. Our findings suggest that the
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rapid concentration of income to the top is largely the consequence of tax cuts
for the top income groups, even though majority of tax reforms enact marginal
rate changes over the entire income distribution.
We conduct a novel test to determine whether the top income shares re-
spond primarily through real economic activity or simple tax avoidance. With
the newly constructed series for marginal capital gain tax rates, we estimate
the consequences of counterfactual tax experiments that change the marginal
rates for regular income but not the marginal rates for capital gains, and vice
versa. We show that a counterfactual marginal tax cut just for regular income
hardly changes the shares of capital gains in top income. However, a counter-
factual marginal tax cut just for capital gains significantly increases the shares
of capital gains. This suggests the tax cut for capital gains will induce strong
tax avoidance from the top taxpayers, but have small and insignificant effect
on real income and unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 3 discusses the variable definitions and data sources. Section
4 outlines the methodology, in particular the narrative approach of structural
vector autoregression. Section 5 presents the results and relates to the con-
temporaneous findings in the literature. Section 6 concludes and discusses the
implication on marginal tax policies. Appendix provides more details on data
constructions and data sources.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Rising Income Inequality and Its Sources
The comprehensive studies on income inequality have sparked debates on fac-
tors that drive the rising income inequality in developed countries. The most
prevalent view is that recent technological development has skewed the income
distribution by placing a high premium on the college-educated and highly-
skilled while reducing the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled workers (Card,
1996; Acemoglu, 1998; Bekman et al., 1998). Meanwhile, the globalization is,
perhaps, the second leading contender to explain rising inequality in developed
countries. Globalization contributes to an increase in the wages of skilled rel-
ative to unskilled workers by equalizing the factor prices across economies. A
series of studies have argued that the increasing trade and financial liberaliza-
tion played an important role in rising wage inequality (Borjas et al., 1997;
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Krugman, 2008).
The redistributive policy has been cited as another factor. In particular,
changes in tax code over last four decades are argued to favor the rich over the
middle class and the poor. Auten and Carroll (1999) use the 1986 tax reform
as a natural experiment and argue that changes in tax rates have significant
effects on reported incomes and should not be ignored in discussions of rising
inequality. Mertens (2015) shows the exogenous cut in marginal tax rates raises
income growth, but disproportionally more at the top of the income distribu-
tion. In addition, other factors are also viewed as potential causes of income
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inequality, such as the shift to services (Blum, 2008; Katz and Murphy, 1992),
changes in the distribution of schooling and ability (Blackburn and Neumark,
1993; Grogger and Eide, 1995; Murnane et al., 1995), and institutional factor
changes (Card, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Lee, 1999).
In this study, we focus on uncovering the effect of tax policy on income
inequality. We present time series evidence on the responses of top income
shares to marginal income tax rates. To address the issue of expectation
and policy endogeneity, we employ the narrative approach under structural
vector autoregressive models (SVARs), following the methodology of Mertens
(2015). In particular, we first selects the tax reforms that are identified by
Romer and Romer (2009) as not motivated by contemporaneous events, and
legislated within one year to rid of the anticipation effect. We then identify the
exogenous variations in marginal tax rates by fitting the inflated pre-reform
income into the post-reform tax schedules (Auten and Carroll, 1999). Based
on this method, we are able to resolve the endogeneity of tax policy, and
explicitly measure the contribution of marginal tax cuts on the rising income
inequality.
2.2.2 Top Income Shares
The recent availability of administrative tax returns data in the United States
has spurred many studies documenting the dynamics of top income shares and
studying the cause for the recent rise in income inequality. In their seminal
paper, Piketty and Saez (2003b) has constructed a homogeneous pre-tax in-
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come series from 1913 to 1998, using data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
statistics of income tax returns. The top 1% income shares in the U.S. has
exhibited a drastic U-shape trend over the 20th century, being pressed down
in the post-war era but rapidly climbing up in the 1980s and showing no sign
of slowing down in recent decades.
Piketty and Saez (2003b) has motivated a large literature documenting
the income inequality trend around the globe: Atkinson (2005) for the United
Kingdom; Saez and Veall (2005) for Canada; Bach et al. (2009) for Germany;
Dell (2005) for Germany and Switzerland; Atkinson and Leigh (2007) for Aus-
tralia, and so on. Atkinson and Piketty (2007), Leigh (2007) and Atkinson et
al. (2011) provide comprehensive reviews of this literature.
In recent years, there has been a growing realization that most of the ac-
tion has been at the very top of income distribution. More specifically, studies
argued the top 1%, or even the top 0.1% income shares, are the main deter-
minant for the rising overall income inequality in many developed economies
(Atkinson et al., 2011). Moreover, the comparison between the United States
and continental Europe reveals that economies experiencing similar skill-biased
technological changes and globalization nevertheless exhibit different trends of
top 1% income shares (Alvaredo et al., 2013). Therefore, studies have increas-
ingly turned to within-country factors, notably tax policies, to explain the
rising top 1% income shares.
The macro literature are largely inconclusive about the effect of taxation
on top income inequality. Slemrod (1996) and Feenberg and Poterba (1993)
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has found changes in marginal tax rates are the main determinant of post-1986
spurt in top income shares, rather than demand-side factors such as technology
advances or globalization. On the other hand, Goolsbee et al. (1999) and Saez
(2004) cover more tax reforms and conclude that the large increase in income
inequality after the 1980s tax reforms are historical anomalies.
However, previous studies that exploit tax reforms as natural experiments
have not fully accounted for the endogeneity of the tax policies. For example,
Dufour and Orhangazi (2014) document that the burden of crises falls dis-
proportionately on labor, particularly in the lower and middle income classes;
while the subsequent stimulus packages and tax changes generally favor capi-
tal, especially financial capital, which largely reside at the top.1
2.2.3 Responses to Marginal Tax Rates
Our paper is also related to the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) literature,
which has been accumulating micro level evidence on how pre-tax income
respond to changes in marginal tax rates. Early studies in ETI literature has
estimated the income responses triggered by the 1980s tax reforms, and find
large elasticities from 1 to 3 for top taxpayers (Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995b;
Auten and Carroll, 1999).
Subsequent studies on tax reforms in the 1990s instead find ETI at the
lower values from 0 to 0.5 (Sammartino and Weiner, 1997). Gruber and Saez
(2002b) cover longer time span with multiple tax reforms, include a larger set
1. See Mertens (2015) footnote 13 for more examples of legislative reforms motivated by
changes in top income and income shares.
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of covariants, and estimate an overall tax elasticity at 0.4. Moreover, they also
conclude this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of
taxable income for top taxpayers (see Saez et al. (2012) for an excellent survey
over the ETI literature).
The primary objective of the ETI literature is to measure the overall effi-
ciency cost of taxation, where the tax elasticity serves as the sufficient statistics
for designing the optimal tax rates for tax revenue maximization (Saez, 2001).2
Despite the primary focus on estimating the overall tax elasticity, the ETI lit-
erature generally agree that tax elasticities are larger for higher income groups,
suggesting marginal tax cuts would disproportionately benefit the higher in-
come groups and raise income inequality (Gruber and Saez, 2002b; Mertens,
2015). Our paper complements this literature by studying the equity side of
the debate and estimates the quantitative effect of marginal tax cuts on top
income shares.
2.2.4 Narrative Approach in Structural Vector Autore-
gression
Our empirical strategy follows the narrative approach in structural vector au-
toregression models (SVARs). Pioneered by Sims (1980), SVARs construct
a system of multiple interrelated time series that first sort out the dynamic
relationship between policy and outcome variables and subsequently identify
contemporaneous causal effect of policy variable by imposing identifying re-
2. Wu et al. (2017) point out the difference between ETI and elasticity of the Pareto
parameter with respect to the top tax rate after accounting for the extensive mobility of the
top income group into and out of the top tax bracket.
47
strictions. Subsequent studies mainly differ in their identification assumptions.
The narrative approach involves constructing a series from historical doc-
uments to identify the exogenous change in the variable of interest. For ex-
ample, Hoover and Perez (1994) collect the occurrence of political events that
disrupted in world oil markets to identify oil shocks. Romer and Romer (2004)
use the meeting minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee to identify
the monetary shocks. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011b) use de-
fense news reports from Business Week to identify the government spending
shocks. In our paper, we identify the exogenous changes in marginal tax rates
based on the narrative series of tax legislative changes collected by Romer
and Romer (2009). Our identification strategy follows the methodology pro-
posed by Mertens and Ravn (2013, 2014) and Mertens (2015). We discuss the
narrative approach in details below.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Top Income Shares
The income-related variables are obtained from Piketty and Saez (2003b) and
the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2016). Income is
defined as all market income items reported in tax returns and before all de-
ductions, before individual income taxes and payroll taxes, and before govern-
ment transfers. It is noteworthy that realized capital gains represent a very
volatile component of income with large year-to-year variations from stock
market and housing market fluctuations. Therefore, we follow Piketty and
48
Saez (2003b) and exclude capital gains from both income levels and income
percentile ranking as benchmark measures.
Figure 2.1 shows top 1% income shares excluding capital gains dropped
sharply after the World War II and remained stable around 8 to 10 percent
in post-war era. Top 1% income shares rose quickly since late 1970s and
continued rising from 1980 to 2000, eventually peaked at 16 percent in 2000
and went down following the burst of the dot-come bubble. However, the
downward trend was short-live, and the top 1% income shares rebounded in
mid 2000s. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007 brought another episode
of temporary downturn and subsequent rebound. The top 1% income shares
including the capital gains followed a similar pattern, but were more volatile.
Comparatively, the income shares of the top 1% to 5% income group was
much more stable and rose gradually from around 12 percent in 1946 to 16
percent in 2012 (see Appendix Figure B1). Similarly, the income shares of the
top 5% to 10% rose from 10 percent to around 11 percent during the period.
It is clear that even in the top decile income groups, income dynamics were
drastically different, and much of the actions took place at the very top of
income distribution.
2.3.2 Average Marginal Tax Rate
The data series for average marginal income tax rates (AMTR) of the top
1% are obtained from Mertens (2015).3 The constructed average marginal tax
3. See Appendix Figure B3 for raw data series constructed by Mertens (2015).
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rates has taken into account both the marginal individual income tax rate and
the average marginal payroll tax rates, weighted by Piketty and Saez (2003b)’s
income concept. Mertens (2015) constructs the marginal individual income tax
rate series based on the Piketty and Saez (2003b) income concept and extend
those of Saez (2004) by almost 30 years using data from the IRS Statistics of
Income. The average marginal payroll tax rates series are constructed from
data published by the Social Security Administration as well as individual IRS
tax returns. See Mertens (2015) Data Appendix for the details of constructing
the AMTR series.
Figure 2.1 presents the series graphically. The most notable finding is, over
the last 40 years, the U.S. federal tax reforms have generally moved the federal
income tax system in the direction of lowering tax progressivity (Piketty and
Saez, 2007).
There was a declining trend of top marginal individual income tax rates.
In the early 1960s, the highest statutory individual income tax rate was 91
percent. This highest marginal tax rate declined to 28 percent by 1988, in-
creased significantly to 39.6 percent in 1993, but fell to 35 percent as of 2003.
On the other hand, there has been a substantial increase in payroll tax rates
to finance Social Security benefits and the Medicare program. The combined
employee-employer payroll tax rate on labor income has increased from 6 per-
cent in the early 1960s to over 15 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover,
the Social Security payroll tax applies up to a cap – equal to $110,100 of annual
earnings in 2012, and is therefore regressive. Overall, the declining marginal
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individual income tax rate for the top-income and rising payroll tax for the
middle-income have reduced the progressivity of the U.S. federal income tax
rates.
More specifically, the AMTR for the top 1% income group in Figure 2.1
display an upward trend starting at around 40% after the World War II and
rose to 55% in the mid 1950s. The rates fluctuated around 50% from late
1950s to the beginning of 1980s, then dropped rapidly and continuously to as
low as 27% in 1990. Tax reforms during the Reagan legislation effectively cut
the top marginal tax rates by half during the 1980s. The downward trend of
the top 1% marginal tax rate was reversed by the Clinton legislation in early
1990s, resurging back to 40% in mid 1990s. The rate then displayed a gradual
downward trend to about 37% in 2012.
Appendix Figure B2 shows the AMTR series for three different income
groups within the top decile. The AMTR for the top 1% to top 10% has gone
through a rather different trajectory than the top 1%. The top rates for the
top 1% to top 10% group started an upward trend in the post WWII era. The
upward trajectory accelerated in the 1970s primarily due to high inflation and
bracket creep. The rates peaked at around 45% at the beginning of 1980s, and
dropped to 35% in the 1990. Since then, the rates remained stable at around
35% till 2012.
51
2.3.3 Average Marginal Capital Gains Tax Rate
We construct the series of average marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR)
from year 1946 to 2012. We first determine the marginal capital gains tax rates
for each tax brackets and each filing status reported in annual IRS individual
income tax return files, and then weight by taxable income. The construction
algorithm is developed from the Matlab codes created by Mertens (2015) to
construct the average marginal individual income tax rates. Appendix B pro-
vides more details on how the individual marginal capital gains tax rates are
determined from 1946 to 2012.
To obtain the “average” rates for top-income groups, we weight marginal
capital gains tax rates by taxable income rather than capital gains for three
reasons. First, the progressivity of marginal capital gains tax rates depends on
the taxable income. For example, in 2012, the marginal tax rate on long term
capital gains is 20 percent in the highest income bracket, where the ordinary
income is taxed at 39.6 percent.
Second, the annual IRS individual income tax files provide insufficient in-
formation to pin down the actual realized capital gains consistently for the
top 1% income group. The threshold for the highest tax bracket was some-
times lower than the top 1% income threshold, especially after a series of tax
reforms that significantly reduced the number of tax brackets in the 1980s.
Moreover, for some years, the IRS files reports only taxable income in each
tax bracket, but no capital gains in each tax bracket. Therefore, we can only
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weight marginal capital gain tax rates by taxable income, not the capital gains.
Third, since a capital gain is only taxed when a capital asset is sold or
exchanged, top taxpayers have a strong incentive to strategize its realization
when expected future rate changes.4 Under the strategic timing of capital gains
realization, the AMCGTR weighted by realized capital gains will artificially
go up before expected future rate hikes as top taxpayers expedite the sales of
capital assets in anticipation. This would create a positive correlation between
AMCGTR and capital gains shares in income when there is no tax reform yet.
Instead, if we use taxable income excluding the capital gains as weight, the
AMCGTR series are less plagued by the anticipation effect.
Figure 2.2 shows the newly constructed AMCGTR for the top 1% income
groups, as well as the share of capital gains in top 1% income, obtained from
updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b).5
The AMCGTR for the top 1% group stayed at the range between 25% to
27% during the post-war era until 1970. Then the AMCGTR has gone through
a roller-coaster ride, first climbing rapidly to a peak of 46% in late 1970s, then
dropping just as quickly to 22% by mid 1980s, and rising once again to 34%
in early 1990s. The rate remained stable to the mid 1990s, but decreased to
16% in 2004 and remained low to 2012.
4. For example, capital gains shares of the top fractile group rose dramatically from 23.6%
to 38.8% in 1985, just before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 raised the highest marginal capital
gains tax rates.
5. Capital gains are expressed in percentage of total income including capital gains, where
the income fractiles are defined by total income excluding capital gains. See updated Table
A8 Panel A of Piketty and Saez (2003b) for capital gains shares in other income fractile
groups.
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Appendix Figure B2 shows the trend of AMCGTR for the top 1 to 5%, and
top 5 to 10% are very similar to the top 1%, albeit at smaller scale. Moreover,
the progressivity of the top AMCGTR series decreased quickly after mid 1970s,
and the AMCGTRs within the top decile converged after early 1990s.
2.4 Methodology
When examining the tax policy impact on income inequality, a major concern
is that instrumenting with statutory changes alone does not rule out the en-
dogeneity of tax policy itself. To resolve this endogenous problem, we adopt
the methodology and identifying restrictions based on the structural vector
autoregressive models.6 The main strategy for measuring exogenous changes
to marginal tax rates in this paper is based on the narrative analysis of Romer
and Romer (2010) and the identifying restrictions proposed by Mertens and
Ravn (2013, 2014) and Mertens (2015). The methodology combines the quasi-
experimental approach with traditional SVAR analysis.
This method differs from conventional univariate analysis in several ways.
First, it highlights the need for including a sufficiently rich set of lagged
macroeconomic controls to separate out unanticipated variations in tax rates
and reported top income share. Second, based on a selection of policy reforms
that are less likely to be driven by other contemporaneous events, this method
allows us to identify the exogenous components of the unpredicted variation
in tax rates. Third, the method enables the estimation of the full dynamic
6. See Ramey (2016) for a survey of the SVAR literature and recent developments.
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effects on top income share and allows for general equilibrium mechanisms by
including a variety of other endogenous variables. The method also identifies
the expected future dynamics of tax rates, which is crucial for interpreting
ETI estimates. Finally, by incorporating total income and the unemployment
rate as endogenous variables, the SVAR model reveals whether reported top
income share effects are related to other important real economic activities.
2.4.1 Model Setup
Consider a general representation of the dynamics of top income shares
sharet = d1t + A1(L)vt−1 + α1vot + α2v
τ
t (2.1)
where d1t captures all deterministic terms, A1(L) is a lag polynomial of poten-
tially infinite order and vt = [v
τ
t , v
o
t ]
′ is a vector that contains structural shocks
with E[vt] = 0, E[vtv
′
t] = Σ is a diagonal matrix and E[vtv
′
t−i] = 0 for i 6= 0.
The vector of shocks consists of exogenous innovations in top marginal tax
rate vτ as well as all other impulses vot that affect the dynamics of top income
shares sharet. The parameter α2 captures the contemporaneous impact of an
unanticipated shock in taxes on top income share, which is of major interest
in this study. Let Xt be a vector of control variables, including log average
income of the entire population, unemployment rate, and so on. Consider
ln(1− AMTRt) = d2t + A2(L)vt−1 + β1sharet + β2Xt + vτt (2.2)
Xt = d3t + A3(L)vt−1 + γ1vot + γ2v
τ
t (2.3)
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where d2t, d3t capture deterministic terms and A2(L), A3(L) are infinite order
lag polynomials. The first equation describes the behavior of the log net-of-tax
rate 1 − AMTRt for the top income tax units as a function of (i) the entire
history of shocks; (ii) a contemporaneous tax rate shock vτt ; and (iii) additional
control variables Xt. The parameter β1, β2 capture any instant feedbacks from
top income shares or any element of Xt on tax rates. The second equation
specifies the dynamics of Xt with γ2 measuring the short run effect of tax
shocks on Xt.
Together, Equation 2.1 to 2.3 provide a representation of all the variables
as function of histories of unobserved i.i.d. random variables, including the
unanticipated shock to top marginal tax rates. Since the system allows for all
possible dynamic causal effects, this general form can represent any kind of
linear dynamic economic models.
Identifying exogenous innovation to top tax rates, vτt , requires additional
assumptions. The first key assumption is that there exists a finite order vec-
tor autoregressive (VAR) representation of the joint dynamic behaviors of
sharet, ln(1 − AMTRt) and Xt. This assumption requires that there are (at
least) as many shocks as endogenous variables, dim(Xt) = dim(v
o
t ) − 1, and
that a finite number of lags of the endogenous variables suffice to capture the
entire histories of shocks. The VAR representation is given by
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 ln(1− AMTRt)sharet
Xt
 = dt +B(L)
 ln(1− AMTRt−1)sharet−1
Xt−1
+
 uAMTRtusharet
uxt

(2.4)
where dt contains deterministic terms, B(L) is a lag polynomial of finite order
p − 1 and p is the lag length. If the set of endogenous variables is informa-
tional sufficient, the reduced form residual usharet , u
τ
t and u
x
t are related the the
structural shocks vτt and v
o
t by
uAMTRt = v
τ
t + β1u
share
t + β2u
x
t
usharet = α2v
τ
t + α1v
o
t
uxt = γ2v
τ
t + γ1v
o
t
The validity of the above equation is determined by the selection of variables
included in Xt and the lag length p. Both of them determine the span of the
conditional information set. An appropriate choice of Xt and p ensures that
the VAR residuals correspond to unpredictable variation in the variables and
therefore that all anticipated changes in top marginal tax rates are controlled
for.
2.4.2 Identification Restrictions
The VAR residuals usharet , u
τ
t and u
x
t are straightforward to estimate by OLS.
However, we need more assumptions to identify the exogenous innovation
to tax rate vτt . The identification strategy follows exactly Mertens (2015),
Mertens and Ravn (2013, 2014) and Stock and Watson (2008, 2012) and relies
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on the availability of a proxy measure mt for the latent structural tax shock
vτt that satisfies the identification assumptions:
E[mtv
τ
t ] 6= 0 (2.5)
E[mtv
o
t ] = 0 (2.6)
The first condition shows that mt is contemporaneously correlated with the
structural shock to top marginal tax rates. The second condition states that
mt is contemporaneously uncorrelated with all other structural shocks. When
these conditions hold, we can utilize the variable mt as an instrument to esti-
mate α2, β1, β2 and γ2 as follows:
1. Regress usharet and u
x
t on u
τ
t using mt as instruments. The residuals in
these regressions are nsharet and n
x
t .
2. Regress uτt on u
x
t and u
share
t using n
share
t and n
x
t as instruments, which
yields unbiased estimates of β1 and β2. The residual in this regression is
the estimate of vτt .
3. Regress usharet and u
x
t on v
τ
t to obtain estimates of α2 and γ2.
Once the contemporaneous impact of an unanticipated exogenous shock is
evaluated, the effects in subsequent years can be obtained using the dynamic
system in Equation 2.4. Based on the resulting impulse response functions,
we may trace out the dynamic adjustments of all including variables with the
shocks in top marginal tax rates.
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2.4.3 Narrative Series
The construction of the proxy mt for exogenous changes in tax rates plays a
crucial role in the narrative approach of SVAR. The proxy variable should be
correlated with the actual AMTR, but at the same time uncorrelated with
other contemporaneous macroeconomic variables. Mertens (2015) has done
this in three steps. First, he collects instances of tax reforms that can rea-
sonably be considered to be contemporaneously exogenous from the narrative
account of all major postwar federal tax reforms conducted by Romer and
Romer (2009). The selected reforms are legislated to either address budget
deficit or promote long-run economic growth, i.e. objectives unrelated to con-
current events. Tax reforms aimed to increase government spending or business
cycle related are omitted.7
Second, reforms with more than one year of implementation delay or have
gradual multi-year phase-ins are dropped to minimize the anticipation effect.
After the selections, there are 15 remaining tax reforms between 1946 and 2012,
which have introduced a decent amount of surprise innovations to individual
marginal tax rates.8
Third, the exogenous impact of the selected tax reforms is measured by
calculating the statutory component of the legislative changes relative to pre-
existing law. More precisely, the estimated impact in year t of a given selected
7. See Romer and Romer (2010); Barro and Redlick (2011); Mertens and Ravn (2013) for
more examples of exploiting the same classification of post-war tax reforms to identify tax
policy shocks.
8. Mertens (2015)’s Appendix A provides a list of the main provisions in each of these
reforms with detailed descriptions.
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tax reform is the difference between two counterfactual tax rates. The first is
calculated using the year t − 1 income distribution and the current law rates
and brackets deflated by any automatic adjustments between t− 1 and t, and
the second is based on the year t − 1 income distribution and the prior law
rates and brackets. The tax proxy mt differs from the “synthetic” tax prices
proposed by Auten and Carroll (1999) by taking into account the automatic
inflation indexation of tax brackets started in 1987.
After the three-steps construction, eight tax reforms generate measurable
changes in AMTRs, which reflect key provisions of the major reforms, such as
the tax cuts of 1948 and 1964, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Bush-Clinton
tax increases as well as the acceleration in 2003 of earlier tax cuts. More
importantly, the proxy mt measures the contemporaneously exogenous and
unanticipated shocks in AMTR induced by tax reforms. Based on the same
methodology, we construct the proxy series for the average marginal capital
gains tax rates as well.
2.4.4 Variable Specification
The key policy variable is the log net-of-tax rate, ln(1 − AMTRt), and the
outcome variable of interest is the top 1% income shares, sharet, expressed in
percentage terms. The benchmark SVAR model includes a set of controls Xt:
log aggregate income per tax unit, the unemployment rate, the log real stock
market index, and the federal funds rate. These variables generally capture
business cycle conditions and interactions with monetary policy.
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We also include log real government spending per tax unit (purchases and
net transfers) and the log change in real federal government debt per tax
unit. These variables are included to capture interactions with other current
and past fiscal policies, in particular since tax changes are often motivated by
concerns about government deficits. The (recent) history of these variables as
well as top income share and tax rates are among the most likely to contain
the relevant information to isolate the unanticipated short run innovations in
tax rates and top income share.
The benchmark SVAR includes two lags (p = 2) of sample covering 1948-
2012 and includes dummy variables for 1949 as well as 2008 as additional
regressors.9 Standard lag selection criteria recommend one to three lags. How-
ever, inspection of the residuals indicates a minimum of two lags is required
to eliminate evidence of residual autocorrelation. Besides, including more
lags would make the VAR coefficient imprecise due to the curse of dimen-
sions. Therefore, we include two lags as our benchmark specification. We
also include the 95% and 99% confidence intervals for the estimated impulse
responses, which is generated by recursive wild bootstrap using 10,000 repli-
cations (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004).
In the application of the wild bootstrap, we multiply in each artificial sam-
9. The inclusion of the 1949 and 2008 dummies, both recession years, is not innocuous. The
first and last few years in the sample are periods of relative macroeconomic turbulence and
unusual policy variation associated with the end of WWII and the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
As a result, variations in the start and end points of the sample leads to some instability
in the VAR coefficients and impulse responses. Rather than dropping these periods from
the sample, as is common practice, the dummy variable approach yields results that are
more stable across subsamples while preserving the major 1948 tax reform as a source of
identifying variation.
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ple every ut and mt with a random variable taking on values of 1 or 1 with
probability 0.5. Thus, the bootstrap inference procedure also takes into ac-
count uncertainty about identification and measurement. The standard resid-
ual bootstrap is problematic given that mt contains many zero observations,
which means that drawing with replacement from mt yields zero vectors with
positive probability. We now proceed to discuss the benchmark results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Response of Top Income Shares
Figure 2.3 presents the impulse responses induced by a one percent increase in
the top 1% net-of-tax rate identified using the top 1% AMTR proxy. The figure
also displays 90% and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for a horizon up
to 6 years. The upper left panel shows that an unanticipated decrease in taxes
has a persistent effect on the top 1% AMTR. The initial increase in net-of-tax
rate is magnified slightly into the second year, and decreases slowly from the
third year onwards.
Top 1% income shares responds positively to the unanticipated decrease
in AMTR, rising on average by 0.08 percentage points in the year of the tax
cut and by 0.14 percentage points in the following year. Both estimates are
significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the rise in top 1% income shares is
very persistent after the decrease in the AMTR, remaining at 0.13 percentage
points well into the fourth year, which shows the cut in top AMTR has long-
lasting effects on top income shares. This confirms the earlier univariate shares
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analysis of Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Slemrod (1996) and provides
further evidence that income inequality is indeed responsive to top marginal
tax rates.
A cut in the top 1% AMTR also lead to a significant increase in aggregate
income (lower left panel) and a significant decrease in the unemployment rate
(lower right panel). Aggregate income increases by 0.22 percent on impact
and 0.41 and 0.40 percent in the second and third year. Unemployment rate
decreases by 0.07 percentage points on impact and 0.12 and 0.11 percentage
points in the second and third year. Similar to the effect on top 1% income
shares, the effect of top AMTR cut on aggregate income and unemployment
appears to be persistent and significant. The persistent responses from aggre-
gate income and unemployment rate show that top 1% AMTR cut has real
effects on the economy as a whole, which demonstrates the equity-efficiency
tradeoff of income taxation.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the impulse responses and the associated
confidence intervals as obtained from the SVAR system in Figure 2.3. Panel
B of Table 2.2 shows the effects of top 10% AMTR cut on the top 10% income
shares, identified by the top 10% AMTR proxy. Similarly, one percent increase
in net-of-tax rate induces an immediate and persistent growth in both the top
10% income shares and the aggregate income, and a persistent decrease in
unemployment rate.
However, the dynamic responses are more transitory for AMTR cuts in
the top 10%. The third and fourth year estimates of responses from the top
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10% income shares and aggregate income revert to zero more rapidly and the
estimates become insignificant in the fourth year. This shows the behavioral
responses from the other 9% in top decile are more short-termed than the top
1%. One possible explanation is that the top 1% taxpayers generally have
more opportunity in taking advantage of the tax cuts, thus exhibiting larger
long-term elasticities than lower income groups (Saez et al., 2012; Mertens,
2015).
Figure 2.4 evaluates the effect of one percent increase in top 1% net-of-tax
rate on the Pareto Index, another popular measure of income inequality that
describes the rate of income accruing to the highest income even within the
top income group. A smaller number of Pareto Index represents more unequal
income distribution. The Pareto Index series are obtained from Alvaredo et
al. (2016). Figure 2.4 upper right panel shows the Pareto Index decreases
dramatically after the top 1% AMTR cut, and the decreases are statistically
significant at 1% level well into the fourth year.
A question of considerable interest is how the changes of AMTR contribute
to the historical movements of top income shares. To answer this question,
we first focus on two representative tax reforms, and report the actual and
projected changes in Top 1% AMTR and income shares in Table 2.3. Panel
A corresponds to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Panel B refers to the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.
Table 2.3 shows that the counterfactual tax experiment replicating the ex-
ogenous shocks from the 1986 tax reform explains more than three quarters of
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variations in top percentile income shares in the following three years. Sim-
ilarly, counterfactual tax experiment replicating the exogenous shocks from
the 2003 tax reform explains around one-third of variations in top percentile
income shares from 2004 to 2006. These findings suggest that the major tax
reforms have considerable impacts on shaping the top income share patterns
in the short run.
2.5.2 Response Along Income Distribution
Earlier studies on income inequality are mostly concerning about the wage
dispersion, college premium and inter-decile income ratio such as P90/P10
ratio. Recent availability of micro level tax return data has enabled researchers
to look into the top decile groups and study the income concentration within
the highest earners (Gruber and Saez, 2002b). Figure 2.5 depicts the income
shares dynamics of the top decile earners divided into three groups: the top
1%, top 1 to 5% and top 5 to 10%, after a one-percent increase in the top 1%
net-of-tax rate. Similarly to Figure 2.3, the upper right panel of Figure 2.5
shows the top 1% income shares rise immediately after the tax cut and remain
persistently higher than the original level years after the tax cut.
On the other hand, the income shares of the top 1 to 5% do not respond at
all in the first two years, and the impulse responses in all six years are small
and insignificant at any conventional level. Comparatively, the income shares
of the top 5 to 10% experience a noticeable drop of nearly 0.02 percentage
points in the second year. The drop of top 5 to 10% explains about a quarter
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of the increase of the top 1%, while the rest of the gains for the top 1% are
contributed by the bottom 90%. This result shows that even within the top
decile group, the income gap is widening under top AMTR cuts, and the
economic gains are increasingly concentrated at the very top of the income
distribution.
We also conduct a counterfactual tax experiment in Figure 2.6 that cut the
top 1% AMTR while restricts the initial shocks of the bottom 99% AMTR to
zero. The SVAR specification of Figure 2.6 differs from Figure 2.5 by including
both the top 1% and bottom 99% AMTRs as policy variables and identifying
the system with both the top 1% and bottom 99% AMTR proxies.
More specifically, we order the top 1% AMTR first and the bottom 99%
AMTR second in the equation (4) and identify the exogenous shock to the
top 1% AMTR by upper Cholesky factorization of the SVAR residual covari-
ance matrix. The first column of the upper triangular factorization yields the
response to an unanticipated counterfactual tax reform that affects top 1%
AMTR but has no impact on bottom 99% AMTR. The associated income
shares responses are therefore due to a change in the top 1% AMTR since any
direct effect from the bottom 99% AMTR is restricted to be zero on impact.
This identification restriction that combines the narrative approach and the
traditional Cholesky factorization is developed in Mertens and Ravn (2013);
Mertens (2015), and used to identify the exogenous shocks of corporate tax
liability versus personal tax liability, and average tax rate versus marginal tax
rate respectively.
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Impulse responses estimates from Figure 2.6 are remarkably similar to that
of Figure 2.5, although the confidence bands are slightly wider due to inclusion
of more variables. As expected, the bottom 99% AMTR has had little effect in
shaping the income concentration within the top decile. Results from Figure
2.5 and Figure 2.6 imply that the rapid concentration of income to the top is
largely the consequence of tax cuts for the top income groups, even though
majority of tax reforms enact marginal rate changes over the entire income
distribution.
2.5.3 Regular Income Tax versus Capital Gain Tax
Recent studies from ETI literature debate that behavioral responses of the
top income to top AMTR cuts are mainly due to tax avoidance rather than
income creation (Slemrod, 1996; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Saez et al., 2012;
Piketty et al., 2014). Studies supporting the avoidance hypothesis argue that
the top taxpayers have more sophisticated portfolio to offer more opportunity
to shift income between different forms and sources. Piketty and Saez (2003b)
has documented an increasing trend of share of capital income, such as rents
and capital gains for higher income groups.
Capital gains play an important role in generating the avoidance incentive,
as taxpayers can strategically choose the realization of capital gains to take
advantage of changes in marginal tax rates. Moreover, capital gains are gener-
ally taxed at preferential rate compared with other income, and recent decades
see a decreasing progressivity of marginal capital gains tax rates (see the Ap-
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pendix for historical AMCGTR progressivity). However, studies of the capital
gains taxation are mostly focusing on entrepreneurial incentives (Keuschnigg
and Nielsen, 2003, 2004), and empirical findings of the effect of capital gains
tax rate on top income inequality and tax avoidance behaviors are relatively
scarce.
In this section, we analyze the dynamic effect of top AMCGTR on top
income shares and top capital gains shares in total income. The SVAR frame-
work together with narrative account of unanticipated tax reforms are useful
here to separate out the anticipation effect, as the capital gains realization
is subject particularly to more timing and anticipation effect. On the other
hand, our model is silent on the anticipation effect of capital gains realization.
Figure 2.7 shows the dynamic responses from a one-percent increase in
top 1% net-of-tax AMTR, while restricting zero initial change in the top 1%
AMCGTR. The SVAR identification here follows the same methodology of
Figure 2.6, which yields the response to an unanticipated counterfactual tax
reform that affects top 1% AMTR but no impact on top 1% AMCGTR. The
impulse responses from top 1% income shares are almost identical in magnitude
as in Figure 2.3, however slightly less imprecise. Expectedly, top 1% AMCGTR
rise immediately on impact, as marginal capital gains tax rate is determined
based on individual’s total income. The rise in top 1% AMCGTR, however,
is not significant and appears more transitory than the increase in top 1%
AMTR.
More interestingly, the movements of both top 1% AMTR and AMCGTR
68
does not incite much reaction in the capital gains share in top 1% income.
The impulse responses of capital gains shares (lower right panel) are mostly
small and insignificant, although following a similar hump shape as the top
1% AMCGTR. Figure 2.7 shows that taxpayers do not change their capital
gains realization if there is no explicit change in AMCGTR schedule.
Figure 2.8 complements Figure 2.7 by showing the dynamic responses from
a one-percent increase in top 1% net-of-tax AMCGTR, while restricting zero
initial change in the top 1% AMTR. See Data Appendix for examples of tax
reforms that change AMCGTR schedule independently from the AMTR sched-
ule. Four points of the resulted impulse responses worth notice.
First, the effect of exogenous shocks on the top 1% AMCGTR is rather
transitory (upper right panel). Second, the response from the top 1% AMTR
is initially small, but rising steadily after the second period. The rise in top
1% AMTR is stabilized at around 0.4 percent after the fifth period. Third,
the responses of the top 1% income shares remain small and insignificant in
the post-reform years. Fourth and most interestingly, the capital gains share
in the top 1% income rises significantly after the AMCGTR cut: it rises by
0.5 percentage points on impact, and remains 0.3 percentage points above the
original level four years into the counterfactual tax reform. This gives strong
evidence of avoidance incentive from the top taxpayers to expedite their capital
gains realization to take advantage of the lower AMCGTR.
Comparison between Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 also reveals that tax reform
on AMTR alone does not guarantee strong avoidance behaviors from the top
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income group in the forms of strategizing capital gains realization. However,
when the changes in AMCGTR schedule is explicit and independent from
the AMTR schedule, it represents an opportunity that top taxpayers simply
cannot resist. This finding confirms the previous studies on the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, where the change in AMCGTR schedule is salient and large, that
tax avoidance remains an important channel of behavioral responses of top
income group.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent studies on income inequality have sparked debates on factors driving
the rising income inequality in developed countries. This paper contributes
time series evidence to show how top income shares respond to exogenous
changes in marginal income tax rates. We combine existing macro methodolo-
gies with the reported income measures and the newly constructed series on
average marginal capital gains tax rates. We address central concerns related
to timing, expectations and in particular the endogeneity of tax policies by
using structure vector autoregression with narrative series of tax reforms in
the United States.
We find that changes in top marginal income tax rates has significant effect
on top income inequality, after accounting for the endogeneity of tax policies
and the dynamics of various macroeconomic factors. Under one-percent in-
crease in net-of-tax rates, the top 1% income shares will rise by 0.08 percent-
age in the first year and 0.14 percentage in the second year. In particular, a
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counterfactual tax experiment replicating the exogenous tax cuts of the 1986
tax reform explains more than three quarters of actual rise in top 1% income
shares from 1987 to 1989.
The investigation of response along income distribution shows that the
rapid concentration of income to the top is largely the consequence of tax
cuts for the top income groups, even though majority of tax reforms enact
marginal rate changes over the entire income distribution. With the newly
constructed series for marginal capital gain tax rates, we estimate the conse-
quences of counterfactual tax experiments that change the marginal rates for
regular income but not the capital gain tax rates, and vice versa. We find the
counterfactual tax cut in marginal rate only for capital gains induces strong
tax avoidance from the top taxpayers, but have small and insignificant effects
on real income and unemployment.
Our analysis has demonstrated the clear trade-off between efficiency and
equity in taxation: tax cuts for the top-income boost the economic growth
and reduce unemployment rates (Mertens, 2015), but exacerbate the income
inequality. This finding cautions the policymakers to carefully evaluate the
outcomes of tax cut. In particular, the increased income inequality largely lies
in top income group, which highlights the importance to compute the “opti-
mal” level of progressive tax for different income group. Lastly, the existence
of tax avoidance also demand a careful assessment of determining different
types of tax.
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TABLE 2.1
Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observation Mean S.D. Min Max
Year 67 1,979 19.49 1,946 2,012
Top 1% shares 67 0.113 0.0353 0.0774 0.189
Top 1% AMTR 67 0.452 0.073 0.288 0.556
Top 1% AMIITR 67 0.560 0.140 0.335 0.808
Top 1% AMCGTR 67 0.272 0.077 0.162 0.467
Log Total Income 67 10.58 0.248 10.02 10.91
Unemployment Rate 67 0.0575 0.0165 0.0290 0.0970
Log Stock Price 67 6.209 0.695 4.851 7.499
Federal Fund Rate 67 0.0455 0.0328 0.0010 0.152
Log Spending 67 -11.18 0.379 -12.23 -10.63
Log Real Debt 67 0.0055 0.0708 -0.185 0.201
Notes: The top 1% income shares are obtained from updated series of Piketty and Saez
(2003b), based on the income measures that include all market income reported in individ-
ual tax return and exclude realized capital gains and government transfers. The top 1%
average marginal tax rates (AMTR) and top 1% average marginal individual income tax
rates (AMIITR) are obtained from Mertens (2015), which is the sum of marginal individual
income tax rate and marginal payroll tax rate, weighted by individual income. The top 1%
average marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR) are constructed by the authors. Other
variables in the benchmark SVAR system include log total income per tax unit, unemploy-
ment rate, log government spending per tax unit, log changes in federal debt, real stock
prices and federal funds rate from 1949 and 2008. Data sources are detailed in Appendix.
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TABLE 2.2
Impulse Responses to Top Marginal Net-of-Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable log(1-AMTR) Income
Shares
Total Income Unemployment
percent percentage percent percentage
Panel A: Top 1%
First year 1.00*** 0.08*** 0.22*** -0.07**
( 1.00, 1.00) ( 0.03, 0.10) ( 0.09, 0.34) ( -0.11, -0.02)
Second year 1.25*** 0.14*** 0.41*** -0.12***
( 0.78, 1.45) ( 0.08, 0.17) ( 0.23, 0.63) ( -0.18, -0.05)
Third year 1.17*** 0.13*** 0.40*** -0.11***
( 0.55, 1.34) ( 0.06, 0.15) ( 0.20, 0.60) ( -0.15, -0.04)
Fourth year 1.01** 0.13** 0.34** -0.07**
( 0.23, 1.15) ( 0.04, 0.14) ( 0.07, 0.53) ( -0.11, -0.00)
Panel B: Top 10%
First year 1.00*** 0.14*** 0.43** -0.16**
( 1.00, 1.00) ( 0.05, 0.22) ( 0.06, 0.80) ( -0.28, -0.01)
Second year 1.13*** 0.19*** 0.80*** -0.28***
( 0.58, 1.33) ( 0.07, 0.25) ( 0.34, 1.39) ( -0.45, -0.13)
Third year 0.95*** 0.16** 0.77*** -0.25***
( 0.24, 1.25) ( 0.01, 0.23) ( 0.29, 1.43) ( -0.36, -0.09)
Fourth year 0.68** 0.13 0.59 -0.14
( 0.08, 1.07) ( -0.01, 0.20) ( -0.09, 1.27) ( -0.27, 0.07)
Notes: This table presents the estimated impulse responses to 1% increase in top marginal
net-of-tax rate, log(1− AMTR). Coefficient estimates are based on SVAR system that in-
cludes the top 1% average marginal tax rates (AMTR) and the top 1% income shares, using
the top 1% income group specific proxies for identification. The income shares are from
updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are from
Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax unit,
unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices, fed-
eral funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Panel A reports impulse responses of top
1% income shares and top 1% AMTR; Panel B reports those of top 10%. In parentheses
are 95% confidence intervals based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications. Asterisks denote
10%, 5% or 1% significance.
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TABLE 2.3
Actual and Projected Changes in Top 1% AMTR and Income
Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Tax Reform Act of 1986
Actual change Projected change
year AMTR proxy net-of-tax Income share net-of-tax Income share
percentage percent percentage pecent percentage
1 -10.15 15.16% 1.62 18.76% 1.50
2 0 31.39% 4.04 23.45% 3.28
3 0 31.52% 3.48 21.95% 2.85
Panel B: Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Actual change Projected change
year AMTR proxy net-of-tax Income share net-of-tax Income share
percentage percent percentage pecent percentage
1 -3.3 4.02% 0.22 5.54% 0.44
2 0 4.44% 1.35 6.93% 0.97
3 0 4.86% 2.69 6.48% 0.84
Notes: The top 1% income shares are obtained from updated series of Piketty and Saez
(2003b). The top 1% net-of-tax rates are log one minus AMTR, obtained from Mertens
(2015). Column (2) lists the estimated exogenous change in AMTR induced by unantici-
pated tax reforms. The numbers are the difference between a first AMTR calculated using
the year 0 income distribution and the new statutory rates and brackets deflated by any
automatic adjustments between year 0 and year 1, and a second AMTR based on the year
0 income distribution and rates and brackets under prior law for year 1. Column (4) and
(5) are computed using impulse response estimates from SVAR model in Figure 2.3.
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FIGURE 2.1
Historical Rates: Top 1% Income Shares and Top 1% Average
Marginal Income Tax
Notes: The top 1% income shares are obtained from updated series of Piketty and Saez
(2003b), based on the income measures that include all market income reported in individual
tax return and exclude realized capital gains and government transfers. The top 1% average
marginal tax rates (AMTR) are obtained from Mertens (2015), which is the sum of marginal
individual income tax rate and marginal payroll tax rate, weighted by individual income.
Data sources are detailed in Section 3 and Appendix.
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FIGURE 2.2
Historical Rates: Top 1% Capital Gains Shares and Top 1%
Average Marginal Capital Gain Tax
Notes: The capital gains shares in top 1% income are obtained from updated Table A8
of Piketty and Saez (2003b). Capital gains shares are expressed in percentage of income
including capital gains while income ranking is defined excluding capital gains. Top 1%
average marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR) are computed by the authors using
annual IRS Statistics of Income and the algorithm of Mertens (2015). Data sources are
detailed in Section 3 and in Appendix.
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FIGURE 2.3
Impulse Response of Top Income Shares to Top Income Tax Cut
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of top income shares to one
percent increase in top marginal net-of-tax rate, log(1 − AMTR). Impulse responses are
based on SVAR system that includes the top 1% average marginal tax rates (AMTR) and
the top 1% income shares, using the top 1% AMTR proxies for identification. The income
shares are from updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy
series are from Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income
per tax unit, unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock
prices, federal funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95%
confidence bands based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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FIGURE 2.4
Impulse Response of Pareto Index to Top Income Tax Cut
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of Pareto Index to one percent
increase in top marginal net-of-tax rate, log(1 − AMTR). Impulse responses are based on
SVAR system that includes the top 1% average marginal tax rates (AMTR) and the Pareto
Index, using the top 1% AMTR proxies for identification. The Pareto Index are obtained
from updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are
from Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax
unit, unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices,
federal funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95% confidence
bands based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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FIGURE 2.5
Impulse Response of Top Decile Income Shares to Top Income Tax
Cut
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of income shares in the top decile
group to one percent increase in top marginal net-of-tax rate, log(1 − AMTR). Impulse
responses are based on SVAR system that includes the top 1% average marginal tax rates
(AMTR) and the income shares of the top 1%, top 1 to 5% and top 5 to 10%, using
the top 1% AMTR proxies for identification. The top income shares are obtained from
updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are from
Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax unit,
unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices, federal
funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95% confidence bands
based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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FIGURE 2.6
Impulse Response of Top Decile Income Shares to Top Income Tax
Cut, Holding Bottom Rate Fixed
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of income shares in the top
decile group to one percent increase in top marginal net-of-tax rate, log(1−AMTR), while
holding the marginal rate constant for the bottom 99% group. Impulse responses are based
on SVAR system that includes both top 1% and bottom 99% average marginal tax rates
(AMTR) and the income shares of the top 1%, top 1 to 5% and top 5 to 10%, using both top
1% and bottom 99% AMTR proxies for identification. The top income shares are obtained
from updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are
from Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax
unit, unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices,
federal funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95% confidence
bands based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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FIGURE 2.7
Impulse Response of Top Capital Gain Shares to Top Income Tax
Cut, Holding Capital Gain Tax Fixed
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of top capital gains shares to
one percent increase in top marginal net-of-tax income tax rate, log(1 − AMTR), while
holding the marginal capital gains tax rate fixed. Impulse responses are based on SVAR
system that includes the top 1% average marginal tax rates (AMTR), the top 1% average
marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR), the top 1% income shares and the capital
gains shares in top 1% income, using the top 1% AMTR proxies and top 1% AMCGTR
proxies for identification. The income shares and capital gains shares are obtained from
updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are from
Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax unit,
unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices, federal
funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95% confidence bands
based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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FIGURE 2.8
Impulse Response of Top Capital Gain Shares to Top Capital Gain
Tax Cut, Holding Income Tax Fixed
Notes: This figure presents the estimated impulse responses of top capital gains shares to
one percent increase in top marginal net-of-tax capital gain tax rate, log(1 − AMCGTR),
while holding the marginal income tax rate fixed. Impulse responses are based on SVAR
system that includes the top 1% average marginal tax rates (AMTR), the top 1% average
marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR), the top 1% income shares and the capital
gains shares in top 1% income, using the top 1% AMTR proxies and top 1% AMCGTR
proxies for identification. The income shares and capital gains shares are obtained from
updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b) and AMTR series and proxy series are from
Mertens (2015). Other variables in SVAR system include aggregate income per tax unit,
unemployment rate, government spending, changes in federal debt, real stock prices, federal
funds rate and dummies for 1949 and 2008. Dash lines are 90% and 95% confidence bands
based on 10,000 wild bootstrap replications.
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Chapter 3
Mobile Appointment App and
Streamlined Medical Service: A
Successful Case from China
3.1 Introduction
Before dawn on an ordinary day, the queue for consultation registration out-
side Beijing Union Hospital, one of the nation’s flagship research hospitals, has
stretches for hundreds of meters. While this particular hospital may be the
worst case in the country, the media has long reported that “queues at Chinese
hospitals are legendary” (Economist, 2017). Though much of the overcrowding
can be attributed to a shortage of medical resources, the mismatch between
healthcare supply and demand must not be overlooked. In China, the hospital-
bed utilization rate has reached 102 % in large research hospitals, but is only
around 60 % in small primary-care facilities (National Bureau of Statistics,
2015). Elsewhere in the world, suboptimal allocation of limited medical re-
sources has been documented in both developing and developed countries. In
the US, a shortage of general practitioners and oversupply of specialists con-
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tributes to both underprovision and excess spending (Jauhar, 2014; Japsen,
2016). Despite wide recognition of the supply-demand mismatch in Chinese
healthcare system, changes have been scarce and late in coming (Eggleston et
al., 2008).
Institutional reforms, such as introducing a general-practitioner-based re-
ferral system and better incentivizing primary-care providers, are necessary to
correct the mismatch. However, these reforms are progressive and expensive.
In this paper, we document the success of a mobile outpatient appointment
application (app) – a lightweight information technology (IT) innovation – in
improving supply and demand alignment in China. This app was designed
by a private Chinese healthcare IT company, which we refer to as the Com-
pany hereafter, and launched by the Company’s client hospitals. Prior to the
app’s launch, these hospitals, like most Chinese hospitals, accepted only walk-
in registration for outpatients, who would queue for consultation. Launching
the app is inexpensive to hospitals (around 2 million CNY or 0.3 million USD
per hospital), and it changes their operations only by streamlining consulta-
tion appointments, informing patients of doctors’ availability, and allowing
advanced booking for hourly slots.
Our objective is to evaluate whether and how the app improves hospital
operations and the match between supply and demand across time and hospi-
tals. To this end, we were granted the access to the Company’s longitudinal
dataset of hospital-department-day outpatient records from 2013 to 2016 for
22 urban hospitals in a developed coastal province of China. All the sampled
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hospitals are using the Company’s uniform Hospital Information System. By
the end of the observational window, 9 of the 22 hospitals had launched the
appointment-scheduling app. The app was launched at different times, and the
sequentiality of app adoption allows a staggered difference-in-differences (DID)
analysis. This method’s key identification assumption, exogenous launch tim-
ing, is backed by the app’s institutional features and formal falsification tests.
To supplement the hospital-department level analysis, we also examine a sep-
arate dataset, the app-user data, to study the impact of the app’s subsequent
launches on its first batch of users.
Our findings are twofold. First, we establish that the app improves hospital
operations by boosting outpatient consultation visits by 9.5%. This is achieved
by increasing registration counts by 4.8% and reducing cancellations, which
are defined as a registered patient’s failure to see a doctor on the registration
day, by 3.4%. The cancellation rate averaged 12% in our sampled hospitals
prior to the app launch, which suggests that one out of every eight registered
patients walked away before consulting a physician, possibly deterred by the
long queues. By informing patients of doctors’ availability and allowing ad-
vance booking, the app effectively reduces the cancellation waste. The extent
of reduction implies tens of millions in increased hospital revenue and avoided
patient opportunity costs.
Second, the app serves as a “soft” triage mechanism that facilitates better
matching between patients and hospitals:
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1. We find that in post-adoption hospitals, patients avoid busier weekdays
and increase their visits during less busy weekends. The app-user data
show that although subsequent app launch reduces average waiting time
for users across all days of the week, the reduction on weekends is the
largest.
2. In large tier-three hospitals, we find that the app reduces walk-in regis-
trations and increases visits by reducing cancellations. In tier-two hos-
pitals, we find that a net increase in registrations explains the increase
in visits. This is a welcome outcome, as in China tier-three hospitals
are often overcrowded and tier-two hospitals are underutilized (Yip and
Hsiao, 2008, 2014).
3. We find that after app launch, the increment in total visits mostly occurs
in departments that handle more severe medical conditions in tier-three
hospitals and those that handle less severe conditions in tier-two hospi-
tals, which suggests that patients are better able to choose the “right”
hospitals according to their medical needs.
Overall, our findings demonstrate that the app is an affordable and easy-to-
implement step toward better healthcare provision in China and, possibly,
many other developing countries.
Our work is related to three streams of literature. First, on non-price fac-
tors that influence the healthcare demand, previous research finds that the
patient’s choice of hospital is responsive to information, such as that from
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social network (Moscone et al., 2012), hospital report cards (Dranove and
Sfekas, 2008), and government websites (Varkevisser et al., 2012). Studies
by Gaynor et al. (2016) and Cooper et al. (2011) document patients’ “shop-
ping” for hospitals when provided with more information and choices. In this
paper, we study the effect of providing appointment availability information
and scheduling flexibility. Our findings of improved hospital operations and
demand-supply alignment show that non-price factors, such as length of wait-
ing, ease of hospital access, and provision of information, are clearly important.
Second, our paper also addresses healthcare resources’ allocative efficiency:
how to direct limited funds toward purchasing an appropriate mix of health-
care services (Garber and Skinner, 2008). Previous studies have documented
extensive supply-side culprits for the lack of allocative efficiency, such as an
oversupply of specialists (Baicker and Chandra, 2004), distortion in physician
incentives (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014), and expensive but narrowly targeted
medicine and technologies (Chandra and Skinner, 2012). Our work contributes
by documenting demand-side factors’ importance in allocative efficiency: when
better-informed and given more choices, patients are able to sort into more ef-
ficient utilization of healthcare resources.
Finally, our analysis of the app adds to a growing literature of healthcare
IT, such as the adoption of electronic medical records by US hospitals (Miller
and Tucker, 2011; Agha, 2014; McCullough et al., 2016), mobile handheld
technologies that enhance physician’s productivity (Prgomet et al., 2009), and
mobile-phone-based interventions for patient adherence to medical treatment
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(Chow et al., 2015; Lester et al., 2010; Ramachandran et al., 2013).
3.2 Background
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we first discuss three features of
the Chinese healthcare system that are particularly relevant to understanding
why the app may be valuable. We include a more elaborated discussion on the
Chinese healthcare system in Appendix C. We then describe the app’s design,
functionality, and launch process.
3.2.1 Three Features of the Chinese Healthcare System
Three-Tier Public Hospital System China established a three-tier hospi-
tal system between the 1950s and 1960s. The system’s structure and function
have not radically changed since then (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015).
The three tiers can generally be regarded as communal- (tier one), township-
(two), and city-level (three) hospitals. The classification is slightly different in
rural and in urban areas, and depends on weighted scores of hospital character-
istics. Size measures, such as the number of inpatient beds, are predominant
classifiers (Ministry of Health, 1989). Lower-tier hospitals mainly provide pri-
mary and preventive care, perform basic surgical procedures, and serve local
communities. Tier-three hospitals provide more comprehensive care, such as
acute care and specialist services. They also play a dominant role in medical
education and research. All three tiers have outpatient departments that serve
walk-in patients.
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Lack of a Referral System There is no general-practitioner-based referral
system in China, nor any other formal protocol for patient referral (Xu et al.,
2010). Any patient can simply walk into a hospital’s outpatient department,
queue to register, and join another line to consult physicians. Consequently,
the nation’s public health insurance system typically does not require a valid
referral from lower-tier hospitals or general practitioners to the reimbursement
of costs incurred in higher-tier hospitals.
Lack of Price Differentials The outpatient consultation fee is regulated
and capped at a very low rate across all hospitals. In our sampled hospitals,
it is generally less than 15 CNY (around 2 USD). Not only is the consultation
fee nondifferentiable across hospitals, but prices for prescription drugs and ba-
sic diagnostic tests are also heavily regulated and do not differ significantly
between hospitals in different tiers (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). The price mecha-
nism that steers supply and demand for outpatient consultation, therefore, is
largely missing.
Because of this lack of a referral system and price differentials, patients tend
to skip community healthcare facilities and flood into high-ranking hospitals
(Eggleston et al., 2008). The disparity between tier-three and tier-one hos-
pitals quickly escalated after market-oriented healthcare reforms in the 1980s
and 1990s. Tier-three hospitals have grown rapidly in size and captured the
dominant share of skilled physicians, patients, and revenue. In contrast, lower-
tier facilities are increasingly understaffed and underfunded, which creates a
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downward spiral for the quality and reputation of lower-tier facilities. In 2014,
the average tier-three hospitals in China employed 26 times more physicians
and nurses, treated 27 times more patients, and generated 60 times more rev-
enue than their tier-one counterparts. The bed occupancy rate in tier-three
hospitals averages 101.8 %, in contrast to only 60.1 % in tier-one hospitals
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Table 3.1 provides descriptives that
contrast hospital characteristics in different tiers. Like Beijing Union Hospi-
tal, many tier-three hospitals are overcrowded, experience long waiting time,
and disappoint many registered patients who leave the queue before being seen
(Yip and Hsiao, 2008; Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2015).
3.2.2 The Mobile Outpatient Appointment App
App Designer The mobile outpatient-appointment app was designed by
a publicly listed healthcare IT company (the Company) in China. By the
end of 2016, the Company had launched the app in more than 300 client
hospitals in China and had close to 10 million app users. The Company
typically charges a hospital around 2 million CNY (0.3 million USD) for the
app and its future maintenance, but does not otherwise interfere with the
client hospital’s operations.
In addition to the app, one of the Company’s main products is a hospi-
tal information system (HIS), which is a one-stop IT solution for hospitals.
To ensure a uniform data standard, we only sample hospitals that use the
Company’s HIS.
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Main Functions of the App The app has two main functions: displaying
physicians’ availability and allowing advanced booking. It is a mini-program
add-on onto WeChat, which is a mega social-network application: Its daily
active users account for more than 88% of all Internet users in China (Clover,
2016). The app works on all mobile platforms and does not require a separate
app-store download or installation. We show the app interface in Figure 3.1.
After opening a hospital’s page on the app, the user is presented with the
left-hand panel, which provides visual guidance to help match his/her illness
or symptoms to a hospital department. Clicking on a department leads to the
middle panel, where the user can browse on-duty physicians’ available hourly
consultation slots for the next two weeks. After booking the desired time slot
on the right-hand panel and paying the registration fee via the app, the user
can arrive at the designated time, skipping the queue for registration and with
minimum on-site wait before seeing the physician. The user can cancel the
appointment using the app for a full registration fee refund by midnight one
day before the appointment date.
Launch of the App Upon signing a sales contract, the Company dispatches
IT technicians to integrate the client hospital’s existing outpatient appoint-
ment system with the app. How soon the pre-launch preparation is completed
varies greatly, and depends on IT system complexity and compatibility, as
well as constraints on the Company’s and hospital’s manpower. Typically, the
preparation phase lasts four to six months. The identification of our difference-
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in-differences analysis requires that the app launch time be exogenous, after
controlling for hospital and time fixed effects. Given the long preparation time,
it is highly unlikely that an adopting hospital is able to coordinate the app
launch time with anticipated demand shocks.
On or around the app launch date, the adopting hospital often holds a
press conference or other marketing techniques, such as website banners and
oﬄine posters to announce the launch. These marketing efforts are mostly app-
centric. Therefore, though our estimated effect may pick up these marketing
efforts, they should be interpreted as bundled with app adoption.
App-adopting hospitals typically allocate only a small fraction (around
10%) of registration slots online and retain the majority for oﬄine patients.
Based on conversations with the Company and some sampled hospitals, we do
not believe that hospitals change work schedules or increase their workforce
upon app launch. Indeed, we find no post-adoption increase in total registra-
tions for hospitals that, before app launch, were likely to operate at close to
capacity.
3.3 Data & Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Hospital Operation Data
Our first and primary dataset includes daily hospital-department-level outpa-
tient records for 22 urban hospitals in a developed coastal province of China.
The Company constructed the data by aggregating patient records in hospi-
tals’ HIS. The sample covers the period January 1, 2013 to September 20, 2016.
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The panel is unbalanced, because four hospitals installed HIS progressively in
the course of 2013 and their observations are not available until HIS is up
and running. Nonetheless, from September 3, 2013 onwards, all 22 hospitals
are observed until the end of the sample period. The first app launch was in
August 2014. By the end of sample period, nine hospitals had adopted the
app.
We examine three categories of outcome variables to measure hospital oper-
ations: (1) total number of registrations for outpatient consultation, (2) total
number of consultation “visits,” defined as consultation sessions that actually
occurred, and (3) registration cancellation rate, defined as the ratio between
registration-visit difference and total registrations. A cancellation can be an
“informed” one, in which a registered patient informs the hospital by cancel-
ing through the app or revisiting the registration counter, or an “uninformed”
one, in which a registered patient simply forfeits his/her registration. In the
empirical analysis, we do not distinguish between these two types of cancella-
tions.
The three outcome variables are further classified as either “online” or
“oﬄine.” Online registrations are those made in advance through the app,
and oﬄine registrations are made on-site at hospitals. Online/oﬄine visits
refer to those following online/oﬄine registration. The online/oﬄine cancel-
lation rate is the ratio between online/oﬄine registration-visit difference and
online/oﬄine total registrations. Since the online outcome variables are defi-
nitionally unavailable before the app launch, we use the six total and oﬄine
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outcome variables as dependent variables in the DID analysis.
We present some descriptive statistics in Table 3.2. The sample covers
nearly 30,000 hospital-days and the app is functioning on 17.1 % of these
days. Table 3.2’s Panel A shows that, on average, the app-adopting hospitals
receive more daily registrations and visits and experience a higher cancella-
tion rate than the non-adopters do. The high cancellation rate is particularly
worth noting: the adopters receive a total of 2,228 daily registrations, out of
which 1,846 eventually visit the physician’s office, leaving 14.6% of registra-
tions unfulfilled. Batt and Terwiesch (2015) document that patients waiting
in hospital lines are sensitive to visual queue length and often abandon queues.
Given the usual crowded condition of Chinese hospitals, such a high cancel-
lation rate is perhaps unsurprising. In Table 3.2’s Panel B, we conduct a
simple before-after app launch comparison. Adopters see daily visits increased
from 1,704 to 2,026 and daily registrations increased from 2,153 to 2,323. The
cancellation rate decreased by 5.4 percentage points for adopters, but barely
changed for non-adopters.
3.3.2 App-User Data
We supplement the primary data by collecting a secondary dataset from indi-
vidual app users. This dataset covers only the app-adopting hospitals in the
same coastal province, including all nine of the adopting hospitals in the first
dataset. At the unit of observation of patient-registration, the sample contains
more than 1.7 million records and covers the period from August 1, 2014 –
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the first launch date – to September 30, 2016. The available variables include
a patient identifier and basic demographics, time at which a registration ap-
pointment is made, hospital department where the appointment is at, whether
it is later cancelled, and time at which the consultation occurs. We are partic-
ularly interested in registration waiting time, defined as the number of hours
that elapse between the moment when a user make a registration appointment
and the consultation hour. This averaged 44.6 hours, which means that app
users book their consultations roughly two days in advance.
3.4 On Hospital Operation
3.4.1 Benchmark Results
We estimate the app’s impact on hospital operations using the following DID
model:
yit = α + βAppit + λi + λt + it, (3.1)
where yit is one of the six outcome variables for hospital i on day t: total
registrations, total visits, total cancellation rate, oﬄine registrations, oﬄine
visits, and oﬄine cancellation rate. Binary variable Appit is one if hospital i
has adopted the app on or before day t and zero otherwise. The coefficient of
interest, β, measures the effect of the app on outcomes. The hospital’s time-
invariant characteristics are controlled by hospital fixed effect λi. Dummy
variables λt include both month fixed effect and year fixed effect, used to
control for time-varying, but hospital-invariant factors. In all analyses, the
number of registrations and visits are in logarithm, such that we can interpret
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the estimated effect as percentage changes.
Table 3.3’s Panel A presents the estimates for Equation 3.1. The simple
model seems to fit the data well, scoring R2 around 0.8 for visits and reg-
istrations and around 0.66 for cancellations. The app increases an adopting
hospital’s total daily visits by 9.5% (Column 1). This is achieved by both in-
creasing registrations by 4.8% (Column 2) and reducing the cancellation rate
by 3.4 percentage points (Column 3). Daily oﬄine registrations shrink by
4.4% after app launch (Column 5), suggesting a straightforward substitution
of registrations from oﬄine to online. This reduction is offset by a drop of
3.6 percentage points in the oﬄine cancellation rate (Column 6), leaving the
number of visits via the oﬄine channel almost unchanged after the app launch
(Column 4).
Without directly observing health outcomes, we refrain from speculative
normative assessments of the changes in registrations and visits. However,
it is difficult to believe that the reduction in cancellations is not efficiency-
improving. Some conservative back-of-envelope calculations help to put the
3.4-percentage-points reduction into perspective. The nine adopting hospitals
in our sample combined saw, on average, 15,741 daily registrations before
the app launch. A 3.4-percentage-points reduction in cancellations means
that, after app launch and on each day, around 535 registered patients who
would otherwise fail to consult a physician can now go through the queue.
On average, each outpatient visit generated around 250 CNY (36 USD) in
revenue for adopting hospitals before the app launch. Hence, the reduced
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cancellation implies an increased revenue of 133,750 CNY (19,110 USD) per
day, or 48.8 million CNY (7 million USD) per year for adopting hospitals.
For these patients, suppose that each of them would have wasted two hours
each for their cancelled hospital visits. Monetizing the wasted hours using
the average hourly wage in the province’s urban cities, 35 CNY (5 USD), the
app thus reduces losses in opportunity costs by 37,450 CNY (5,350 USD) per
day, or 13.7 million CNY (2 million USD) per year. In total, even ignoring
the probable health benefits, the app produces efficiency gains of 62.5 million
CNY (9 million USD) annually through boosting revenue for hospitals and
reducing wasted time for patients.
We attribute the reduction in cancellations to two possible factors. First,
patients with higher opportunity costs of waiting and a higher chance of aban-
doning queues are more likely to switch registration from oﬄine to online.
Since these patients can now arrive at their precise appointment time, they
cancel less often. Second, with online patients arriving at their appointed time,
queues become visually shorter in hospitals’ waiting rooms, which encourages
patients who register oﬄine not to cancel their appointments.
3.4.2 Robustness
Equation 3.1’s casual identification requires that the app launch’s timing be
exogenous – that is, uncorrelated with hospital-specific trends after controlling
for hospital and time fixed effects. In addition to the institutional features
discussed in Subsection 3.2.2, we conduct three statistical tests to support
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this assumption.
Using Emergency Room Visits The benchmark analysis excludes Emer-
gency Room (ER) data. This is because the app does not handle registration
for ER admissions, as visits to the ER are by nature unplanned and unex-
pected. This feature allows us to use ER visits as a falsification test for the
exogeneity of the app-launch timing. If adopting hospitals coordinate app-
launch with (1) anticipated demand shocks, such as an epidemic or patient
population spike, or (2) supply-side changes, such as additional staffing or an
improved IT system, estimating Equation 3.1 using ER visits and registrations
would show statistically significant positive effects. In contrast, Table 3.3’s
Panel B shows negligibly small and statistically insignificant effects.
Using “Placebo” Launch Times In the second test, we create pseudo
launch times for adopting hospitals to determine whether they experienced
pre-adoption trends that were different from those of non-adopters. To this
end, we restrict the sample to the first 19 months of the data (January 2013
to July 2014), when no hospital had adopted the app. Then, we further create
AppTit as a “placebo dummy” that switches to one after a pseudo launch time
T if hospital i is one of the nine adopting hospitals. We set time T to be each
of the 13 months between April 2013 and April 2014 to ensure that there are
at least 3 months of observations on either side of T . Figure 3.2 depicts the
β estimates from 13 regressions and their 90% confidence intervals, obtained
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by estimating Equation 3.1 using AppTit in place of Appit. If, supposedly, the
number of registrations was already rising faster in adopting hospitals than
in non-adopting hospitals during the first 19 months, we would estimate the
coefficients for some placebo dummies to be significantly positive. However,
all estimates are small and statistically insignificant, and significantly different
from the benchmark level (dashed horizontal line). This leads us to reject dif-
ferences in pre-adoption trends between adopting and non-adopting hospitals.
Using Lead and Lag Launch Times We use a set of 12 different pseudo
launch times in the third test: one-, two-, . . . , six-quarter leads and lags of
the true adopting month AppQit . Figure 3.3 plots the 12 estimates and their
90% confidence intervals when using AppQit in place of Appit in Equation 3.1.
Similar to the second test, we find no significant effect in lead quarters. The
estimates corresponding to lagged dummies have economic interpretations:
They capture the dynamic effect of the app after its launch, which puts both
registrations and visits on upward trajectories for adopting hospitals. The
persistent rise of the treatment effect is consistent with a continuous diffusion
of the app’s awareness and usage, though this result should be treated with
caution, as the post-adoption data become more sparse for later lags.
In addition to these three tests on the identification assumption, we take
advantage of the large sample size and its ensuing large statistical power to
examine the main results’ robustness using subsamples. Specifically, we look
at five different ways of constructing subsample: (1) dropping three specialty
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hospitals (dermatology, neurology, and dentistry), (2) dropping weekend ob-
servations, (3) restricting to hospitals in the provincial capital, (4) dropping
observations before September 3, 2013 to get a balanced panel, and (5) re-
stricting to the adopting hospitals. Figure 3.4 presents the estimates of β in
Equation 3.1 for all five subsamples and their 90% confidence intervals. Almost
in every case, we observe a statistically significant increase in total visits, con-
tributed by increased registrations and reduced cancellations. The estimated
effect sizes are also comparable to our main results.
3.5 On Patient-Hospital Matching
The increase in visits and reduction in cancellations suggest that patients have
responded to the additional information and flexibility provided by the app. In
this section, we examine how patients change their visit behavior after the app
launch. Specifically, we consider two channels through which patient-hospital
matching may be improved: time choice and hospital choice.
3.5.1 Days of the Week
Along the time dimension, we examine whether patients adjust the timing of
hospital visits to avoid busy hours following app launch. In China, although
some outpatient departments, such as radiology, may be closed on Sundays,
most departments are generally open seven days a week. In many Chinese
hospitals, including those in our sample, weekdays usually see more visits
than weekends. Table 3.4 provides some descriptive statistics by days of the
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week. Before the first app launch, the average daily visits on weekdays are
40.5% higher than that on weekends (1,630 vs. 1,160). The average registra-
tion cancellation rate is also higher in weekdays than weekends (12.9% vs.
11.8%). Monday is the busiest day of the week, with 1,865 visits and a 13.4%
registration cancellation rate.
To examine whether the app encourages patients to shift visits to less
busy weekends, we estimate the following DID model separately for Monday,
Tuesday, . . . , Friday, and Weekends:
yit = α + βDOWAppit ×DOWt + βOtherAppit ×Othert + λi + λt + it, (3.2)
where binary dummy DOWt is one when day t is the day-of-week of in-
terest and zero otherwise. Binary Othert is DOWt’s complement dummy.
For instance, when we estimate Equation 3.2 for weekends, DOWt/Othert is
one/zero when day t is either Saturday or Sunday and zero/one otherwise.
λi is hospital fixed effect, and λt includes both month fixed effect and year
fixed effect. Note that we run six regressions, one for each weekday, instead
of including six weekday dummies in one regression. This is to allow the fixed
effects to be flexibly different across regressions. As such, the estimates for
βDOW should be interpreted as the app’s absolute impact on the dependent
variables by days of the week, instead of relative to other days of the week.
Figure 3.5 plots the estimates for βDOW as bar charts and their 90% confi-
dence intervals. Both total registrations and total visits increase disproportion-
ally more during weekends than weekdays, suggesting that demand is better
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matched to hospitals’ less busy hours. It is worth noting that despite the
consistent drop in oﬄine registrations on weekdays, the count remains almost
unchanged on weekends. This, together with a reduction in oﬄine cancella-
tions, leads to a statistically significant increase of nearly 5% in oﬄine weekend
visits. The levelled weekend oﬄine registrations could be because the oﬄine-
to-online substitution does not happen on less busy weekends, or because the
app, perhaps by displaying the abundance of time slots, attracts more patients
on weekends through oﬄine channels, which offsets the oﬄine-to-online sub-
stitution. The latter would suggest that the app’s impact spills over to oﬄine
visitors. However, in the absence of individual choice data before and after
app launch, we cannot pin down the mechanism. This remains a caveat of our
analysis.
As a partial remedy, we examine individuals’ choice patterns in the sup-
plementary app-user data. Since the data, by construction, only includes
individuals who use the app after app launch, we cannot assess the effect of
first launch on the general population. Instead, our primary objective is to
examine whether subsequent app launches in the same region shorten one’s
“in-app” waiting time, defined as the number of hours that elapse between
the moment one makes an appointment and the actual consultation. This
waiting time may be either “voluntary,” if one sets the appointment time to
suit his/her own schedule, or “involuntary,” if one’s desired appointment slot
has been taken, or a combination of both. However, if we find evidence that
subsequent launch reduces waiting time, the reduction is most likely for the
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involuntary portion.
In this analysis we estimate separately for Monday, Tuesday, . . . , Friday,
and Weekends:
wijt = α+ βDOWNewijt×DOWt + βOtherNewijt×Othert + λi + λj + λt + ijt,
(3.3)
where wijt is the in app waiting time for patient i in city j with a consultation
appointment on day t. Newijt denotes the number of new apps adopted in city
j on day t since patient i’s first online registration. Binary dummies DOWt
and Othert are defined in the same way as in Equation 3.2. λi and λj are
the individual and city fixed effect, respectively. λt includes both month fixed
effect and year fixed effect.
Figure 3.6 plots estimated waiting time reduction by days of the week and
their 90% confidence intervals. The average reduction is around 2.7 hours
per subsequent launch, which provides suggestive evidence that one hospital’s
adoption has spillover effects on patients of another hospital in the same region,
at least among app users. The reduction is larger on weekends, consistent with
the proposition that the app orients patients to avoid busy days.
3.5.2 Hospital Choice
Though changes in temporal choice appear effective in alleviating hospital
congestion, it is merely a redistribution of demand in the same hospital. By
itself, this is probably insufficient to fundamentally address the misalignment
of healthcare supply and demand. In this section, we examine post-adoption
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changes in patients’ hospital choices.
Among nine app-adopting hospitals, four are tier-three and five are tier-
two. Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics on visits, registrations, and can-
cellations separately for tier-two and tier-three hospitals. All but one of the
tier-two hospitals are comparably small, receiving only one third of the outpa-
tients received by the tier-three hospitals before the app’s first launch. These
small tier-two hospitals mainly provide primary healthcare. The only large
tier-two hospital is comparable in size to the tier-three hospitals and has a
strong focus on maternity and child healthcare.1 We use the following model
to estimate the app’s heterogeneous impact on hospitals of different tiers:
yit = α+βT ierTwoAppit×TierTwoi+βT ierThreeAppit×TierThreei+λi+λt+it,
(3.4)
where TierTwoi and TierThreei are binary indicators for whether hospital
i is a tier-two or tier-three hospital, respectively. Figure 3.7 plots the esti-
mates for βT ierTwo and βT ierThree and their 90% confidence intervals. Both
tiers experience an increase in outpatient visits that is similar in magnitude
to the benchmark result. However, our empirical investigation reveals impor-
tant differences in how the app works for tier-three and tier-two hospitals.
The tier-three hospitals might have already operated close to capacity before
the app launch, leaving little room for net increase in registrations. Instead,
as in the benchmark results, registrations shift from oﬄine to online, reducing
1. All of our results in this section are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude the large
tier-two hospital.
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oﬄine registrations by 8.4%. The streamlined queuing leads to 5.9-percentage-
points reduction in cancellation rate, which explains the increase in visits. For
the tier-two hospitals, we find no evidence that pre-launch oﬄine registrations
shift to online. The 9.9% increase in outpatient visits is mostly driven by
an increase in online registrations. A few factors may attract more online
registrations, including a more convenient appointment-booking system and
hospitals’ marketing efforts after app launch. The two distinct mechanisms
demonstrate the app’s usefulness for both hospitals that are experiencing long
queues and those underutilized.
Interacting hospital tiers with day-of-week provides further evidence that
avoiding overcrowding is an important factor in patients’ hospital choice. Fig-
ure 3.8 plots the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms of hospital tiers
and day-of-week. Tier-three hospitals see a larger increase in visits and regis-
trations on weekends, while tier-two hospitals experience consistent increases
across the entire week. A 4.8% weekend increase in oﬄine registrations in
tier-two hospitals similarly implies that the app’s effect may spill over to of-
fline patients. Using the supplementary app-user data, Figure 3.9 presents
consistent evidence of the reduction of waiting time following subsequent app
launches. The reduction is large and stable across the week when the new
app is adopted by a tier-two hospital, while only statistically significant on
the weekend when the new app’s adoption is by a tier-three hospital.
We present further evidence using the supplement app-user data in Ta-
ble C12, which shows that, for those who have made at least one registration
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on the app, the in-app waiting time is reduced by 5 hours after a tier-two
hospital adopts the app, but only by 0.7 hours after tier-three hospital adop-
tion. This suggests that less busy tier-two hospitals are better able to “attract
away” patients than crowded tier-three hospitals are.
3.5.3 Hospital-Department Choice
With evidence pointing to changes in hospital choice following app launch, a
natural question is whether patients have been induced to make the “right”
choice. Though logically unlikely, if a patient with a severe medical condition
places too much weight on convenience and visits a low-quality hospital after
being informed by the app that high-quality hospitals are crowded, the app
would add to the misalignment of healthcare supply and demand, at least
for that patient. Unfortunately, without detailed health outcome data and
individual choice data, we are unable to directly examine this issue. Instead,
we look for suggestive evidence in hospital-department visits by exploring the
variation in severity of the medical conditions treated by different departments.
Specifically, we map the ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions listed by Shi-
geoka (2014) to the departments of endocrinology, cardiology, pulmonary, urol-
ogy, cardiothoracic surgery, and orthopedics and refer to them as “more severe”
departments. We then categorize ophthalmology, otolaryngology, dermatology,
dentistry, health promotion, rehabilitation, nutrition, and Chinese medicine
into “less severe” departments. We estimate Equation 3.4 separately for the
two categories, excluding the uncategorized departments from the analysis.
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Figure 3.10 plots the coefficient estimates for hospital tiers separately for
each category of departments, and their 90% confidence intervals. For tier-
two hospitals, whose designated role is front-line primary care providers, the
less severe departments experience 15.6% increase in visits and 14.2% increase
in registrations, whereas registrations drop by 5% (statistically insignificant)
and visits remain almost unchanged for the more severe departments. For tier-
three hospitals, although total visits increase for both categories, the largest
increase occurs in the more severe departments (18.9%). Cancellation rate also
takes the largest dip (4.9%) in these departments, implying a much shortened
queue, which promotes an increase of 14.6% in oﬄine visits. Across the board,
the app appears to serve as a self-triage mechanism and direct patients to visit
the “right” hospital based on their medical conditions.
3.6 Conclusion
Our study shows that an inexpensive, lightweight, and non-intrusive “soft” IT
innovation simultaneously improves hospital operations and the alignment of
healthcare supply and demand. In 2015, Chinese hospitals received more than
three billion outpatient visits.2 Holding the supplied resources fixed, even a
tiny percentage increase in total visits could imply a radical improvement in
healthcare access and efficiency; our estimates of the app’s effect in increasing
total visits is 9.5%. Therefore, we believe that the app could be categorized
2. Source: (In Chinese) National Health and Family Planning Commission of
the People’s Republic of China http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/guihuaxxs/s10748/201607/
da7575d64fa04670b5f375c87b6229b0.shtml.
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as a “Type I” intervention in Chandra and Skinner (2012) typology – namely,
a cost-effective “home run” innovation with the potential to benefit a large
population.
Given the severe rationing problem and extremely out-of-date appointment
booking process in Chinese hospitals, one might argue that the app simply
picks up “low-hanging fruit.” We would argue, however, that there is a lot of
low-hanging fruits in the healthcare system of developing and even developed
countries. These are places in which simple economic mechanisms can go a
long way toward improving the quality of life. They warrant more research.
We close by discussing three possible extensions. First, the caveat of ag-
gregate data implies that we cannot definitively assert that the net increase in
registrations in tier-two hospitals is because some patients switch from crowded
tier-three hospitals and other non-adopting hospitals, or due to newly gener-
ated demand for medical services. This is, however, an important question on
the app’s scalability: “what if all hospitals in the medical system adopt such
an app.” In the extreme case that the net increase is purely from patients who
switch from other non-adopting hospitals, the app’s effect on tier-two hospitals
will diminish to zero when all hospitals adopt this app, implying that tier-two
hospitals’ app launches are business-stealing social waste. Individual choice
data are necessary to assess the extent of business-stealing.
Second, our analysis, in large part, ignores the app’s two-sided nature and
focuses primarily on the demand side. In the partially privatized Chinese
healthcare market – and especially if the app can empower tier-two hospitals
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to gain market share from competitors – one would expect that market struc-
ture plays a role in the app’s adoption and diffusion. An extension in this
direction would require data with universal coverage of multiple local health-
care markets.
Last but not least, an IT-based medical intervention runs the risk of creat-
ing new social inequalities based on technological savvy. In terms of this par-
ticular app, using aggregate patient demographic data to examine responses
from different age groups, our results seem to suggest otherwise. For those age
60 and above, the app increases their visits by over 8%, largely from increased
oﬄine registrations (Appendix Table C14). It appears that even though elderly
patients are not as active in using the app, they benefit from the shortened
queues in adopting hospitals. However, the aggregate data are too sparse to
answer this question definitively.
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TABLE 3.1
Comparison of Hospital Performance by Hospital Tier
(1) (2) (3)
Hospital Tier Tier 3 Tier 2 Tier 1
Number of Hospitals 1954 6850 7009
Patients per Hospital 715478 167458 26363
Physicians per Hospital 341 93 16
Nurses per Hospital 524 129 17
Bed Utilization (percent) 101.8 87.9 60.1
Revenue per Hospital (million CNY) 663 101 11
Expenditure per Hospital (million CNY) 631 97 10
Outpatient Registrations Fee (USD) 2.6 1.3 1
Source: China Health Statistical Yearbook 2015.
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TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics Of Hospital Operation Data
Panel A: Adopter-Non-adopter Comparison for All Hospitals
Variable All Non-
adopter
Adopter Adopter-
Non-
Adopter
All Hospitals (22 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 1634 1498 1846 348
Daily Registrations 1887 1668 2228 560
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.120 0.103 0.146 0.043
Observation 29731 18132 11599
% of Days with App Launched 0.171 0.439
Tier-three Hospitals (8 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 2766 2719 2813 94
Daily Registrations 3196 2986 3413 427
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.134 0.091 0.178 0.088
Observation 10976 5579 5397
Tier-two Hospitals (14 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 971 955 1003 48
Daily Registrations 1120 1082 1196 114
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.112 0.109 0.118 0.009
Observation 18755 12553 6202
Panel B: Before-After Comparison for Adopters
Variable Adopter Before After After –
Before
All Adopters (9 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 1846 1704 2026 322
Daily Registrations 2228 2153 2323 170
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.146 0.170 0.116 -0.054
Observation 11599 6509 5090
Tier-three Adopters (4 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 2813 2582 3142 559
Daily Registrations 3413 3311 3559 248
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.178 0.219 0.120 -0.099
Observation 5397 3167 2230
Tier-two Adopters (5 Hospitals)
Daily Visits 1003 872 1157 285
Daily Registrations 1196 1056 1360 304
Daily Cancellation Rate 0.118 0.123 0.112 -0.011
Observation 6202 3342 2860
Notes: All descriptive statistics are tabulated from hospital-level daily operation data,
which contain 22 hospitals. Emergency room admissions are excluded. Panel A compares
non-adopters and adopters, while Panel B compares the before and after for the adopters.
Statistics for tier-three and tier-two hospitals are listed separately. See Section 3.3 for
details on variable definitions.
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TABLE 3.3
Benchmark Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Oﬄine
VARIABLES Visits RegistrationCancellation
Rate
Visits RegistrationCancellation
Rate
Panel A: Non-Emergency Departments
App 0.095*** 0.048*** -0.034*** 0.005 -0.044*** -0.036***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.801 0.817 0.663 0.797 0.813 0.663
Hospitals 22 22 22 22 22 22
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total
VARIABLES Visits RegistrationsCancellation
Rate
Panel B: Emergency Room
App 0.008 0.006 -0.001
(0.032) (0.030) (0.006)
Observations 19,732 19,732 19,732
R-squared 0.894 0.903 0.519
Hospitals 15 15 15
Month FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Hospital FE YES YES YES
Notes: Panel A is for all departments except for the emergency room (ER); Panel B is for
the ER. In Panel B, we exclude seven hospitals that either do not have an ER, or have fewer
than 10 daily ER admissions for more than half of the sample period. Numbers of registra-
tions and visits are in logarithm. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the log total daily
visits, and in Column (2) is the log total appointments registered through the oﬄine channel,
i.e., excluding registrations made through the app. Column (3) is the total appointment can-
cellation rate calculated as total registrations−total visitstotal registrations . Dependent variables in Column (4) to
(6) are oﬄine counterparts. App is the dummy that switches to one after the app is launched
in treatment hospitals. See detailed definitions in Section 3.3. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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TABLE 3.4
Descriptive Statistics By Days of the Week Before App Launch
VARIABLES Daily Visits Daily Registrations Daily Cancellation Rate
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Monday 1,865 1,600 2,200 1,838 0.134 0.0904
Tuesday 1,632 1,439 1,902 1,625 0.128 0.0843
Wednesday 1,558 1,326 1,830 1,520 0.130 0.0891
Thursday 1,538 1,294 1,797 1,487 0.126 0.0840
Friday 1,547 1,310 1,803 1,499 0.125 0.0800
Saturday 1,320 1,070 1,549 1,258 0.120 0.0887
Sunday 1,002 699.4 1,174 877.2 0.116 0.0908
Weekdays 1,630 1,405 1,909 1,608 0.129 0.0857
Weekends 1,160 915.9 1,360 1,099 0.118 0.0898
Notes: This table shows hospital summary statistics broken down by days of the week for
the year 2013.
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FIGURE 3.1
Screenshots of the App
Notes: This figure shows the screenshots of the app’s basic functionality. The left panel
shows the visual guidance to help match the patient’s illness symptom to a hospital depart-
ment. The middle panel guides the patient to the appropriate department. The right panel
allows patients to browse on-duty physicians’ available hourly slots and make appointments
for the next two weeks.
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FIGURE 3.2
Testing the Parallel Trends Between Adopting and Non-Adopting
Hospitals Before the Treatment
(A) Total Visits
(B) Total Registrations
Notes: The figure tests whether there exist differential pre-existing trends between
adopting and non-adopting hospitals in the pre-app period from January 2013 to July
2014. The regression specification is yit = α + βApp
T
it + λi + λt + it, where T ∈
{Apr2013,May2013, ..., Apr2014}, and AppTit is a placebo dummy that switches to one for
adopting hospitals after month T . Each bar represents the estimated β, coupled with the
90% confidence interval. Shaded dashed lines represent the estimated effect of actual app
launch in the full sample period, obtained from Table 3.3. Regression details are reported
in Table C1.
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FIGURE 3.3
Comparing the Dynamic Response Between Adopting and
Non-Adopting Hospitals Before and After the Treatment
(A) Total Visits
(B) Total Registrations
Notes: The figure estimates the dynamic effect of the app on the hospital’s total visits
and total registrations. The regression specification is yit = α +
∑
Q β
QAppQit + λi + λt +
it, where Q ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 6} where AppQ is the dummy indicating the Qth quarter from
the actual app launch. App1 is the dummy for the first three months after the app launch,
and App6 is the dummy for all subsequent months after the 6th quarter following the actual
app launch. All quarterly lags and leads remain zero for control hospitals. Solid dots in
the figure are estimated coefficients β−5 to β6, coupled with 90% confidence intervals. All
regressions include hospital fixed effect, year fixed effect, and month fixed effect. Regression
details are reported in Table C2.
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FIGURE 3.4
Robustness Analysis with Subsamples
(A) Visit
(B) Registration
(C) Cancellation Rate
Notes: The figure checks the robustness of our benchmark results in Table 3.3 by re-
estimating Equation 3.1 on different subsamples. Each bar represents the estimated β,
coupled with the 90% confidence interval. Subsample 1 drops three specialty hospitals.
Subsample 2 drops the weekend observations. Subsample 3 restricts the sample to hospitals
in the provincial capital. Subsample 4 drops the observations before September 3, 2013 to
ensure a balanced panel. Subsample 5 restricts to only the adopting hospitals. Regression
results are reported in Table C3.
117
FIGURE 3.5
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week
(A) Visits
(B) Registrations
(C) Cancellation Rate
Notes: The figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of the app across different days of
the week. We run yit = α + βDOWAppit × DOWt + βOtherAppit × Othert + λi + λt + it
on hospital-level data, where DOWt is the dummy for a given day of week, and Othert is
the dummy for other days of the week. Shaded bars are estimated βDOW , coupled with
90% confidence intervals. Regression results are reported in Table C4 (total) and Table C5
(oﬄine).
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FIGURE 3.6
Waiting Time Reduction by Days of the Week
Notes: The figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of new app adoption on reducing mobile
waiting time across different days of the week. We estimate wijt = α + βDOWNewijt ×
DOWt +βOtherNewijt×Othert +λi +λj +λt + ijt on app-usage data, where wijt denotes
the waiting time on the mobile waiting list, and Newijt denotes the number of new apps
adopted in city j at time t since patient i’s first online appointment. DOWt is the dummy
for a given day of the week, and Othert is the dummy for other days of the week. Shaded
bars are estimated βDOW , coupled with 90% confidence intervals. Regression results are
reported in Appendix Table C6.
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FIGURE 3.7
Heterogeneous Effect by Hospital Tier
Notes: This figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of the app across hospitals of different
size. We run yit = α+βTierTowAppit×TierTwoi+βTierThreeAppit×TierThreei+λi+λt+it
on hospital-level data, where TierThreei and TierTwoi are dummies for tier-three and tier-
two hospitals, respectively. Lighter shaded bars are estimated βTierTow, while darker shaded
bars are estimated βTierThree, both coupled with 90% confidence intervals. Regression
results are reported in Table C7.
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FIGURE 3.8
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week and by Hospital Tier
(A) Visits
(B) Registrations
(C) Cancellation Rate
Notes: This figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of the app across hospitals of different
tiers and across different days of the week. We run yit = α + β1DOWt × TierTwoi +
β2DOWt×TierThreei +β3DOWt×TierTwoi×Appit +β4DOWt×TierThreei×Appit +
β5Othert × TierTwoi ×Appit + β6Otheri × TierThreei ×Appit + λi + λt + it on hospital-
level data, where DOWt is day of the week dummy, and TierThreei is dummy for tier-three
hospitals. Lighter shaded bars are estimated β3, and darker shaded bars are estimated β4,
both coupled with 90% confidence intervals. Regression details are reported in Appendix
Table C8 (visits), Table C9 (registrations), and Table C10 (cancellation rate).
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FIGURE 3.9
Waiting Time Reduction by Days of the Week and by Hospital Tier
Notes: This figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of new app adoption in tier-two and
tier-three hospitals on reducing mobile waiting time across different days of the week. We run
wijt = α+β1DOWt+β2New
TierTwo
ijt ×DOWt+β3NewTierThreeijt ×DOWt+β4NewTierTwoijt ×
Othert+β5New
TierThree
ijt ×Othert+λi+λj +λt+it on app-usage data, where NewTierTwoijt
is the number of new apps adopted by tier-two hospitals, NewTierThreeijt is the number
adopted by tier-three hospitals, DOWt is day of the week dummy, and Othert is other days
of the week dummy. Lighter shaded bars are estimated β2, while darker shaded bars are
estimated β3, both coupled with 90% confidence intervals. Regression results are reported
in Table C11.
122
FIGURE 3.10
Heterogeneous Effect by Type of Department and by Hospital Tier
(A) Visits
(B) Registrations
(C) Cancellation Rate
Notes: This figure estimates the heterogeneous effect of the app across different types of
departments and across hospitals of different tiers. We run yit = α + βTierTwoAppit ×
TierTwoi+βTierThreeAppit×TierThreei+λi+λt+it on hospital-level data from two types
of departments: less serious, and more serious. TierThreei and TierTwoi are dummies for
tier-three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. Light shaded bars are estimated βTierTwo
and dark shaded bars are estimated βTierThree, both coupled with 90% confidence intervals.
Regression results are reported in Table C13. Department categories are defined in Section
3.5.3.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter One
Survey of Consumer Finances
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) provides high quality data on the
household income and wealth. It collects detailed information on households’
assets, liabilities, income and other characteristics, and is specially designed
to over-sample the rich households. To accurately account for the household
wealth distribution, SCF sample design follows a dual-frame structure. The
first part is designed as a standard area-probability (AP) sample to cover
wealth items that are broadly distributed, such as credit cards and mortgage.
The second part consists of a list sample based on individual tax returns from
the Internal Revenue Service to over-sample the high-income households. This
second part aims to provide good coverage of financial items that are highly
concentrated among the rich households, such as stocks and real estates.
Moreover, the list sample also adjusts for differential nonresponse rates and
mitigates the bias due to higher nonresponse rates among the rich. The 1983-
1989 SCF panel contains information on 1479 households who were interviewed
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in both 1983 and 1989. Moreover, the 1983-1989 SCF panel covers one of the
most important tax overhaul in the US history, the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
This presents us a unique opportunity to study the impact of major tax change
in the household wealth dynamics.
IRS Individual Income Tax Returns
We construct the marginal capital tax rates from the IRS individual tax returns
statistics. Our construction of the capital tax involves four important parts:
the income definition, the income distribution, the capital income definition,
and the most importantly, the shares and tax rates for each of the components
of capital income along the income distribution.
Income Definition
We follow the IRS to define total income as the adjusted gross income (AGI).
Since the individual marginal income tax rate and total tax liability are calcu-
lated from the AGI, it is natural to follow this IRS definition. The AGI includes
income from all sources, minus exemptions and deductions. The major income
sources are, salaries and wages, small business and farm income, partnership,
estate and trust, dividends, interest, rents, royalties, capital gains and other
income. We decompose income sources into six major components: wages,
interest, dividends, entrepreneur income, rents, and capital gains. Wages in-
clude standard wages and salaries, pensions and annuities, IRA distributions,
and taxable social security benefits. Entrepreneur income includes income
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from business and profession, partnership and S corporation, and farm in-
come. Rents include rents and royalties, and income from estate and trusts.
Capital gain include net long term capital gains.
Note that both the tax treatment of the major income items and the
marginal tax rates may be different under different tax regimes. Most no-
tably, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has significantly modified the tax law for
all the income brackets and also altered the computation of various income
items.
Income Distribution
The IRS individual income tax statistics tabulates the individual income tax
returns by size of AGI1. The IRS table includes a large number of income
brackets. Within each income bracket, the table provides number of income
tax returns, total AGI reported, and income from each of the income sources.
To define the top income group, we use Piketty and Saez (2003)’s definition
of population total. Population total is defined as the total number of tax units,
adjusted for non-filers. Then we use Pareto interpolation to compute the top
percentile thresholds for the top 1% and top 10%2, and use linear interpolation
around the closest brackets to obtain the threshold level for the top 50%.
For complete details of the Pareto interpolation methods, see Appendix B of
Piketty and Saez (2001).
1. See IRS Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.4.
2. It is well documented that income distribution is approximated by Pareto distribution
in its right tail. Moreover, the SOI table provides a large number of income brackets,
especially for higher income, thus enabling us to apply the Pareto interpolation to calculate
the top income thresholds.
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Capital Income Tax
In US, there is no explicit tax on the personal wealth or capital stock3. The
lack of direct capital tax record restricts the studies of computing capital
tax elasticity from tax reforms. As a result, the literature has reached no
consensus on the level of capital tax elasticity. However, recent studies have
shown that the capital return is stable in the long run, thus it is reasonable to
expect that wealth increments are roughly proportional to wealth stock. As a
result, income tax on wealth increments can be seen as indirect tax on wealth.
For example, wealth held in stocks is taxed through dividends, wealth held
in bonds is taxed through interests, and wealth held in real estate is taxed
through rents4.
The tax liability of wealth is envied on different income components of
wealth increments. Imagine someone has total wealth of W , out of which a
fraction of pr is in real estate, ps is in stocks and pb = 1−pr−ps in bonds. Now
suppose real estate generate Rr% income through rents, stocks generate Rs%
through dividends, and bonds generate Rb% through interest. In addition,
value of stocks and real estates appreciates Rc% per year. How to calculate
the total tax liability in wealth? Dividends, rents and interests are taxed as
ordinary income5, assuming at x% marginal rate.
3. Inheritance is taxed when wealth is transferred across generations. Moreover, inher-
itance tax accounts for a small fraction of federal tax revenue. Thus we do not discuss
inheritance tax in the empirical analysis.
4. There is no federal property tax in the U.S. Real estate taxes are levied by the local
municipalities and counties of the U.S. states. The rates vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, as well as the methods of assessing the value of the property. Thus we do not discuss
property tax here.
5. Note in our construction of capital income tax, we also adjust for exemptions and
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Capital gains from stocks and real estates are taxed at a more preferable
rate, at y% marginally. Then total capital tax liability is then:
pr ·W ·Rr · x+ ps ·W ·Rs · x+ pb ·W ·Rb · x+ (ps + pr) ·W ·Rc · y
Dividing it by total wealth W will produce the marginal capital tax rate as
(wrx+ wsx+ wbx+ wcy) ·R
where wx ≡ pxRxb is the relative share for x in terms of total capital income,
b ≡ [prRr + psRs + pbRb + (ps + pr)Rc] ·W is the total capital income, and
R ≡ b
W
is the aggregate rate of return from wealth. Assuming the aggregate
rate of return is stable in the long run, the marginal capital tax rate on wealth
is proportional to marginal rate on capital income.
Three points are worth notice. First, we only need to compute the relative
shares wx, instead of the more elusive rate of returns Rx from each capital
component, for example from stocks and real estates. This will reduce the
measurement error. Second, the computation of the relative share is made for
each income bracket, thus averaging out the idiosyncratic return shocks and
preserving the progressivity at the same time. It is important to average out
the idiosyncratic return shocks because dividends payment is subject to id-
iosyncratic corporate income shocks, such as profitability, profit retention and
long term corporate investment decision. On the other hand, long term capital
gains realization are also sporadic at individual level. Using average capital
corporate income tax.
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gain share will mitigate the transitory component in capital gain realisations
and capture the permanent and strategic component. Third, as Piketty (2014)
points out, the aggregate rate of return R is stable in the long run. Thus most
of the variation in the marginal capital tax (wrx+wsx+wbx+wcy) ·R comes
from its first component (wrx + wsx + wbx + wcy). In the empirical analysis,
we run the log wealth on log of 1− (wrx + wsx + wbx + wcy) while assuming
constant R.
Practically, we need to calculate the share and the marginal tax rate of
each capital income components for each income bracket. Then we use linear
interpolation to obtain the marginal capital tax rate for the top income groups.
The shares of capital income component can be obtained directly from SOI
table by dividing individual capital income items to the total capital income.
However, as all the capital income are taxed through ordinary income tax, we
start from the marginal income tax rate and make necessary adjustments to
reach the marginal rate on each capital income component according to the
tax law.
Marginal income tax rate is progressive based on AGI, and is also different
across different filing status, i.e. jointly or separately. However, the top income
households are predominately filing jointly6. We thus assume all tax returns
in the top groups are filing jointly. This assumption will not bias our results
much but will greatly simplify our computation. We then apply the income
6. The number of married women filing separate returns is positive but fairly small, at
about 1% of all returns in 1998. See Appendix A of Piketty and Saez (2001).
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tax schedule for joint filing households to obtain the marginal income tax rate
in each income bracket. In the following sections, we will refer to this marginal
income tax rate as the benchmark rate. All the marginal tax rates on different
capital components are anchored to this benchmark rate. We summarise the
construction of marginal capital income tax rate on each of the main capital
income components below.
Marginal Interest Tax
Tax on interest is obtained from adjusting benchmark rate for tax-exempted
interest. In 1982, the exemption rate was below 2% for most of income brack-
ets, especially for the top income groups. However, in 1988, interest exemption
rate was much more heterogeneous along the income distribution, and espe-
cially significant for the top income groups. For example, interest exemption
rate is 30.1% for households with AGI over 1 million dollars. The marginal
tax rate on interest is computed as benchmark rate /(1+exemption rate). As
a result, the adjusted marginal tax rate on interest is similar to benchmark
rate in 1982 but differs significantly in 1988.
Marginal Dividend Tax
Tax on dividends is subject to two layers of adjustment. The first adjustment
is due to differential exemption rate in each income bracket. The marginal tax
rate on dividends before exemption is benchmark rate/(1+exemption rate).
Part of the dividends are exempted in 1982, but there is no exemption for
dividends in 1988. The second and more important adjustment is due to
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corporate income tax. As corporate profit is first taxed by corporate income
tax before being distributed as dividends. Suppose corporate income tax is x%
and dividend exemption rate is y%, and benchmark rate is z%. Then wealth
increments from stocks are taxed at 1− (1−x)(1−z)
1+y
.
Here we apply the maximum marginal corporate tax rate to all the income
brackets. Equivalently, we assume a linear corporate tax rate for all the cor-
porate income returns. In practice, the corporate income tax is progressive in
corporate income. However, SCF only provides information on the total value
of stocks each household holds, no information on each stock and its corre-
sponding firm. This assumption will introduce heterogeneous measurement
error in dividend tax rate if there exists systematic differential stock holdings
in different income groups. For example, the measurement error of dividend
tax for higher income brackets will be smaller if the rich households own shares
in companies that have systematically higher corporate income. We do not
think this assumption will bias our results significantly. In other words, by
applying the maximum corporate income tax to all the income brackets, we
overestimate the dividend tax; but this overestimation is likely to be homoge-
neous along the income distribution.
Marginal Capital Gain Tax
Tax rates on capital gains is complicated by the different definitions of long
term gains and the different inclusion percentage of these gains in the AGI
in different years. Generally, long term capital gains are defined as sales or
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exchange of capital assets held for more than one year. However, long term
gains are subject to different tax treatment in different years7. In 1982, only
40% of long term gains were included in the AGI. Equivalently, the maximum
marginal tax on long term gain was 40% of the benchmark rate. However, in
1988, long term gains were fully included in the AGI and taxed equally at the
benchmark rate.
Marginal Capital Tax
So far we have obtained the adjusted marginal tax rates on different capital in-
come components in each income bracket. We can then compute the marginal
capital income tax rate as weighted average of rates on different capital income
components using its shares in total capital income as weights. We calculate
the marginal capital income tax rate in each income bracket. The last step is
to recover the capital tax rate from the capital income tax rate using a sim-
ple formula. Denote the capital income tax as τ ′it, the capital tax as τit and
the total capitalised rate of return on capital as R. The relationship between
capital tax and capital income tax is R(1− τit) = 1 + (R− 1)(1− τ ′it). We can
then obtain τit =
R−1
R
τ ′it. In our empirical estimation, we assume an annual
rate of return to capital as 10%, which corresponds to a six-year capitalised
rate of return R = 1.16 = 1.77. In the SCF 1983-1989 panel data, the average
six-year wealth growth rate is around 1.7. See Table 1 for the marginal capital
tax rate for different top income groups in 1983 and 1989.
7. Historically, short term gains are defined as those held for less than one year, and are
always taxed as ordinary income
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter Two
Historical Marginal Capital Gains Tax Schedule
In this section, we review how marginal capital gains tax rates are determined
in the US tax legislation history from 1946 to 2012. For ease of representation,
we denote the marginal regular tax rate as τ1, and the marginal capital gains
tax rate as τ2.
1946-1969: From 1946 to 1969, tax rule for long term capital gains has not
changed despite various tax reform on other ordinary income items. During
this period, 50% of long term capital gains in excess of short term capital losses
was included in the adjusted gross income and was taxed at regular marginal
tax rate. However, the taxpayers whose regular marginal tax was higher than
50% would find it more advantageous to compute their tax liability using the
alternative tax. The alternative tax was the sum of (a) a partial tax computed
at the regular marginal tax rates on taxable income other than the taxable
long term gains, and (b) an amount equal to 50% of the taxable long term
gains. Considering the 50% exclusion rule for long term gains, if a taxpayer
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faced marginal income tax rate below 50%, his or her marginal capital gains
tax rates was half of the marginal income tax rate; if above 50%, the marginal
capital gains tax rates was capped at 25%.
1970: The Tax Reform Act of 1969 has made two major changes to the
marginal tax rates on long term capital gains. Firstly, under the alternative
tax computation, the first $25,000 of the long term capital gains included in
AGI was taxed at 50%, while the remaining amount was taxed at 59%. Due
to this higher rate, the number of taxpayers who applied the alternative tax
computation declined dramatically in 1970 from one year before. Moreover,
“For returns with the alternative tax, the marginal rate was usually the 59
percent capital gains rate” (SOI 1970, page 152). We thus assume that all the
taxpayers whose marginal income tax rate was above 50% were subject to a
marginal rate of 29.5% on the long term gains included in AGI.
Secondly, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has introduced a 10% minimum
tax on the excluded portion of long term capital gains1. As a result, 50% of
long term capital gains was included in AGI and subject to regular marginal
income tax or the alternative tax, while the other 50% was taxed by the 10%
minimum tax. Therefore, marginal capital gains tax rate τ2 = 1/2 ∗ τ1 + 5% if
marginal income tax rate τ1 <= 50%; otherwise, τ2 = 29.5% + 5% = 34.5%.
1971: Prior to 1971, the tax law has allowed high income taxpayers to elect
the alternative tax computation to limit the first $25,000 of their taxable long
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 has recognized that a substantial part of the “economic
income” (including capital gains) of high income taxpayers had received various kinds of
tax-favored treatment. The TRA 1969 thus introduced a 10% minimum tax on “tax pref-
erences”, which included the excluded long term capital gains from AGI.
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term capital gains to 50%, and the excess of this base to 59%. The Revenue
Act of 1971 has raised the latter rate to 65%. For returns with alternative tax,
the majority of them were subject to the 65% rate (SOI 1971, Table 3.1). Thus
we assume that all the taxpayers whose marginal income tax rates were above
50% were subject to a marginal rate of 32.5% on the long term gains included
in AGI. Together with the 10% minimum tax rate on the excluded long term
gains from AGI, the marginal capital gains tax rate τ2 = 1/2 ∗ τ1 + 5% if
marginal income tax rate τ1 <= 50%; otherwise, τ2 = 32.5% + 5% = 37.5%.
1972-1975: From 1972 to 1975, the alternative tax computation allowed
the taxpayers to subject the first $25,000 of their taxable long term capital
gains to a marginal rate of 50%. The amount in excess of this base was subject
to regular marginal rate (with maximum marginal income tax rate at 70%).
For returns with alternative tax, the majority of them were subject to the
regular marginal rate (SOI 1972-1975, Table 3.1). Thus we assume that the
marginal tax rate on the capital gains included in AGI was half of the marginal
income tax rate for all the taxpayers. As a result, the marginal capital gains
tax rate was 50% of individual marginal income tax rate plus 50% of the flat
minimum tax rate, i.e., τ2 = 1/2 ∗ τ1 + 5%.
1976-1978: In 1976, the minimum tax on excluded long term capital gains
was raised to 15%. As a result, the marginal capital gains tax rate was 50%
of individual marginal income tax rate plus 50% of the flat minimum tax rate,
i.e., τ2 = 1/2 ∗ τ1 + 7.5%.
1979-1980: The Revenue Act of 1978 has introduced two major changes to
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the marginal capital gains tax rate. Firstly, the alternative tax was abolished.
Instead, 60% of long term capital gains were excluded from AGI, and the
excluded capital gains were no longer subject to the minimum tax. Thus the
long term capital gains were essentially taxed at 40% of marginal income tax
rate.
Secondly, The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was introduced by the
Revenue Act of 1978, with the purpose to keep wealthy taxpayers from using
loopholes to avoid paying taxes. The AMT tax was computed, in general, by
adding to taxable income any excluded long-term capital gains, subtracting
$20,000, and subjecting the remainder to a graduated tax ranging from 10 to
25 percent. The taxpayer’s final tax liability was the greater of the regular
income tax and the AMT. However, AMT only applied to a small fraction of
tax units in 1979.
There were two pronounced effects of splitting tax preferences into two
groups, i.e., minimum tax and alternative minimum tax, and computing a sep-
arate tax on each group. On the one hand, many taxpayers escaped without
any additional tax for tax preferences. Since both computations had exclu-
sions, and the one on the alternative minimum tax form was generally larger,
over half the taxpayers who previously owed an additional tax for tax prefer-
ences no longer had such a liability for 1979 (SOI 1979, page 61).
SOI 1979 Table 3A and 3B documented that less than one seventh of tax
units with AGI over $1 million were taxed by the AMT, and this ratio was
even lower in lower income groups. We thus do not consider the effect of AMT
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on the marginal capital gains tax rate. In other words, in 1979 and 1980, the
marginal capital gains tax rate was 40% of the regular marginal income tax
rate, i.e., τ2 = 0.4 ∗ τ1.
1981: In 1981, the share of long term capital gains excluded from AGI
remained at 60%. However, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had
reintroduced the Alternative Tax, such that taxpayers with marginal income
tax rate over 50% were allowed to subject their included long term capital
gains to a constant tax of 50%. As a result, the marginal capital gains tax
rate was reduced to 20%.2
Secondly, the maximum tax rate under AMT was reduced from 25% to
20%. The total AMT liability was the lesser of the gross alternative minimum
tax as computed for 1981, or the tax on alternative minimum taxable income
other than excluded long-term capital gains, plus a 20 percent tax on those
gains. Again, due to small fraction of tax incidents being subject to AMT,
we do not consider the effect of AMT on the marginal capital gains tax rate.
Thus for 1981, the marginal capital gains tax rate τ2 = 0.4 ∗ τ1 if marginal
income tax rate τ1 ≤ 50%; and τ2 = 20% if otherwise.
1982: The alternative tax computation reintroduced in 1981 was repealed
in 1982. However, this did not affect the marginal capital gain tax rates be-
cause the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 had reduced the
maximum marginal income tax rate from 70% to 50%. Thus the 1981 alter-
2. The reintroduced alternative tax computation only applied to long term gains from the
sale of capital assets between June 9, 1981, and December 31, 1981.
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native tax rate on long term gains, 20%, was equal to the maximum rate on
capital gains in 1982, 50%*40%=20%. In 1981, the alternative tax computa-
tion was beneficial only when the marginal income tax rate was larger than
50%. But in 1982, nobody was subject to a rate higher than 50% anymore.
Thus for 1982, the marginal capital gains tax rate was 40% of the regular
marginal income tax rate, i.e., τ2 = 0.4 ∗ τ1.
1983-1986: The share of long term capital gains excluded from AGI re-
mained at 60%. The marginal capital gains tax rate was 40% of the regular
marginal income tax rate, i.e., τ2 = 0.4 ∗ τ1.
1987: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 took effect in 1987 and introduced
a major change for the long term capital gains taxation. In 1987, the 60%
exclusion of long-term capital gains was repealed so that the full amount of
capital gains was included in AGI. However, for 1987 only, the maximum tax
rate on long-term capital gains was limited to 28 percent (up from 20 percent
in 1986), compared to the top rate of 38.5 percent on ordinary income for
1987. As for alternative minimum tax (AMT), no capital gains were included
anymore. Thus the marginal capital gains tax rate τ2 = τ1 if marginal income
tax rate τ1 ≤ 28%; and τ2 = 28% if otherwise.
1988-1990: Long term capital gains were fully included in AGI and taxed
as other ordinary income. Thus the marginal capital gains tax rate equals to
marginal income tax rate, i.e., τ2 = τ1.
1991-1996: A maximum tax rate of 28% for net long-term capital gains
went into effect in 1991, compared to a maximum tax rate of 31 percent on
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other types of income in 1991. The maximum tax rate for long term capital
gains remained at 28% despite two more higher marginal income tax rates
were introduced in 1993. Thus for the period from 1991 to 1996, the marginal
capital gains tax rate τ2 = τ1 if marginal income tax rate τ1 ≤ 28%; and
τ2 = 28% if otherwise.
1997: Several significant changes has been made during 1997 on the def-
inition and marginal tax rates of long term capital gains. The maximum tax
rate for most long-term capital gains realized after May 6, 1997 was reduced
to 20 percent (10 percent for taxpayers in the 15-percent tax bracket). For
long term gains realized before May 7, 1997 or after July 28, 1997 for assets
held more than a year but less than 18 months were still taxed at the 28%
rate. Therefore, for 1997, the long term capital gain tax rate could be 10%,
20%, or 28% (SOI 1997, page 10).
However, for the higher income groups, most of long term capital gains were
subject to the lower marginal rate. For example, for tax units with AGI over
$1 million, less than 1 percent of returns were subject to 28% marginal capital
gains tax (90 thousand returns under 28% rate versus 97 million returns under
20% rate, SOI 1997, Table 3.5). Thus we assume that the marginal capital
gains tax rate τ2 = 10% if marginal income tax rate τ1 = 15%; and τ2 = 20%
if marginal income tax rate τ1 > 15%.
1998-2002: The 28% marginal rate on long term capital gains was elim-
inated. Marginal capital gains tax rate τ2 = 10% if marginal income tax rate
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τ1 = 15%; and τ2 = 20% if marginal income tax rate τ1 > 15%.
3
2003-2007: For capital gains after May 5, 2003, the 10% marginal capital
gain rates were reduced to 5%. The 20% rate was reduced to 15%. Marginal
capital gains tax rate τ2 = 5% if marginal income tax rate τ1 ≤ 15%; and
τ2 = 15% if marginal income tax rate τ1 > 15%.
2008-2012: For capital gains 2008, the 5% marginal capital gain rates
were reduced to zero. The 15% rate remained. Marginal capital gains tax rate
τ2 = 0% if marginal income tax rate τ1 ≤ 15%; and τ2 = 15% if marginal
income tax rate τ1 > 15%.
Data Sources for Other Time Series
The income series are from updates of the data provided in Piketty and Saez
(2003b) and Alvaredo et al. (2016). Potential Tax Units is all married men
and singles aged 20 or over, obtained from Piketty and Saez (2003b); Real
GDP per tax unit is NIPA 1.1.3 line 1 divided by potential tax units; Inflation
is the log change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Research Series Using
Current Methods (CPI-U-RS), obtained from Piketty and Saez (2003b).
The Federal Funds Rate after 1953 is the annual average effective federal
funds rate from the Board of Governors. I use the secondary 3 month T-
bill rate for 1946-1949 and observations from Romer and Romer (2010) for
1950-1953. Government Debt per Tax Unit is federal debt held by the public,
3. In 2001 and 2002, the rate at which net gains (less losses) on sales of capital assets
that were held for at least 5 years was lowered to 8% for 2001 for those individuals who
would otherwise have paid a 10% tax rate on these gains. For all higher income groups, the
marginal rate schedule remained the same.
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measured by Table L.106 line 19 (federal government, liabilities, credit market
instruments) in the US Financial Accounts (release Z.1 of the Federal Reserve
Board), divided by the CPI-U-RS and potential tax units.
Government Spending per Tax Unit is the sum of federal government pur-
chases, net interest rate expenditures and net transfers (NIPA 3.2 line 46 less
lines 3,4,7,10 and 11 plus NIPA 3.12U line 25), divided by the CPI-U-RS and
potential tax units. The Real Stock Price is the S&P composite index from
updates of Shiller (2000), divided by the CPI-U-RS. The Unemployment Rate
and Female Participation Rate are for the civilian non-institutional population
aged 16 or more are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The Average Tax Rate is the sum of federal personal current taxes and
contributions for social insurance (NIPA 3.2 line 3 plus NIPA 3.7 lines 3 and 21)
divided by total market income from Piketty and Saez (2003b). The Average
Capital Gains per Tax Unit is from Piketty and Saez (2003b). Ramey News
is the measure of news about defense spending (annual totals) constructed by
Ramey (2011a). The Moodys Corporate BAA Rate is from the H.15 release
of the Federal Reserve Board.
Education is the percent of people 25 years or over which completed 4 years
of college or more from the Current Population Survey (Table A.2 historical
tables on educational attainment). Missing values prior to 1964 are linearly
interpolated. The Top 10% Income Share is in logs and based on data from
Piketty and Saez (2003b).
Wage inequality is the log difference between average wage income of the
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top 10% and bottom 90%. The Gini Coefficient for families is from the Current
Population Survey (series F4 of historical tables on income inequality). The
average Corporate Tax Rate is federal taxes on corporate income excluding
Federal Reserve banks (NIPA Table 3.2 line 9) divided by corporate profits
(NIPA Table 1.12 line 13 less Federal Reserve Bank Profits in NIPA Tables
6.16 B-C-D). The narrative Corporate Tax Changes series is from Mertens and
Ravn (2013).
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FIGURE B1
Historical Rates: Income Shares
Notes: The top income shares are obtained from updated series of Piketty and Saez (2003b),
based on the income measures that include all market income reported in individual tax
return and exclude government transfers.
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FIGURE B2
Historical Rates: Top Average Marginal Income Tax and Top
Average Marginal Capital Gain Tax
Notes: The average marginal tax rates (AMTR) are obtained from Mertens (2015), which is
the sum of marginal individual income tax rate and marginal payroll tax rate, weighted by
individual income. Income measures are based on Piketty and Saez (2003b) and include all
market income reported in individual tax return and exclude realized capital gains and gov-
ernment transfers. The average marginal capital gains tax rates (AMCGTR) are computed
by the authors using algorithms developed in Mertens (2015). Data sources are detailed in
Appendix.
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FIGURE B3
Historical Rates: Average Marginal Individual Income Tax Rates
1946-2012
Notes: This figure is adopted from Mertens (2015)’s Figure 1. The series are income
weighted averages of marginal federal individual income tax rates and social security (OASDI
and HI) contribution rates. Top and bottom tax percentiles are based on the distribution
of income over potential tax units as in Piketty and Saez (2003b). Shaded areas denote
NBER-dated recessions.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter Three
The Chinese Healthcare System
China developed its primary-care system after the establishment of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in 1949. One of the major achievements was an inno-
vative three-tier healthcare system in public hospitals.1 The first tier generally
consists of community health stations and clinics that have fewer than 100 beds
and are tasked with providing primary care, preventive care, and rehabilita-
tion services at the community level. The second tier is generally represented
by township hospitals in mid-size cities. They are equipped with 100 to 500
beds, and are responsible for more comprehensive health services and medi-
cal training for health-workers in tier-one facilities. The third tier contains
general hospitals at the city, provincial, or national level with a bed capacity
exceeding 500. They provide the most sophisticated acute care and specialist
services. They also play a dominant role in medical education and research,
and serve as medical hubs for multiple regions.
1. The three-tier classification of hospitals is based on weighted scores that measure the
number of beds, level of service provision, medical technology, medical equipment, and
quality of management and medical care. In practice, the three tiers are further subdivided
into 3 subsidiary levels (Ministry of Health, 1989).
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Backed by government funding, the three-tier system was successful in
improving the population’s health and life expectancy across the country. Be-
tween 1952 and 1982, life expectancy increased from 45 years to 68 years, the
infant mortality rate fell from 200 to 34 per 1,000 live births, and longstand-
ing scourges such as schistosomiasis were largely eradicated (Blumenthal and
Hsiao, 2005). In 1984, the “China Model” was highly praised by the World
Bank and the World Health Organization as an effective model for other de-
veloping countries (World Bank, 1984).
Following the economic reforms initiated in December 1978, however, the
market-oriented healthcare reforms of the 1980s and 1990s moved the Chinese
healthcare system onto a different track (Yip and Hsiao, 2008; Blumenthal and
Hsiao, 2015). The reforms gave more autonomy to hospitals and dramatically
cut government financing. Government subsidies fell to a mere 10% of a hos-
pital’s total revenues by the early 1990s and stayed low ever since (Yip and
Hsiao, 2008).
Even through the three-tier structure remains, the disparity between tier-
three and tier-one hospitals has rapidly widened. Tier-three hospitals have
grown quickly in size and captured the lion’s share of skilled physicians, patient
flow and revenue. For example, in 2014 the average tier-three hospitals in
China employed 26 times more physicians and nurses, treated 27 times more
patients, and received 60 times more revenue than their tier-one counterparts
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). (For additional comparisons between
Chinese hospitals in different tiers, see Table 3.1.) In contrast, lower-tier
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facilities are increasingly understaffed and underfunded.2 This has created a
downward spiral in the quality and reputation of the lower-tier facilities, and
motivates patients to flock to tier-three hospitals regardless of the severity of
their illness.
Tier-three hospitals are increasingly overcrowded, and lower-tier hospitals
are increasingly underutilized. By 2014, the bed occupancy rate in tier-three
hospitals is overwhelmingly 101.8%, in contrast to only 60.1% in tier-one hospi-
tals (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). In US hospitals, the most commonly
targeted bed occupancy rate is 85% (Green, 2006). The problems of waiting
and rationing quickly escalated in tier-three hospitals — which has deterred
patients with acute conditions from receiving timely care, and drives many
patients to forfeit treatment without being seen.
Facing these challenges, the Chinese government launched a nationwide
systemic health reform in 2009, pledging to provide more affordable and eq-
uitable access to health care for all citizens by 2020. The reform marked a
departure from the market-oriented strategy used since 1978, and reinstated
the government’s role in the financing of health care and provision of public
goods (Chen, 2009; Eggleston et al., 2008).3 Although the 2009 healthcare
2. China has a large shortage of general practitioners (GP): in 2014, there were only
0.13 GPs per 1,000 population. GPs only account for 5.6% of all physicians across China
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). In contrast, in the UK there are 0.8 GPs per 1,000
population, which account for 28.7% of all physicians (OECD, 2016).
3. The 2009 health reform has five objectives. First, expand public health insurance to
gradually cover more than 90% of the Chinese population, including improved coverage for
urban residents, the new rural cooperative Medicare scheme for rural residents, and the
improved Medicaid scheme for the poor. Second, establish a nationwide drug system with
dedicated high reimbursement rates for a list of essential drugs to provide an affordable drug
supply. Third, provide more public financing and infrastructure support to grassroots health
facilities and county hospitals to expand health service network in rural areas and reduce the
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reform has made great progress in expanding insurance coverage, much work
remains to improve healthcare delivery.
Three long-lasting problems stand out, which also mark the main differ-
ences between the Chinese healthcare system and most western healthcare
systems: (1) there is no effective referral system in outpatient settings that di-
rects traffic to primary-care or acute-care hospitals. (2) The price differential
in registrations fee is too narrow to serve as a screening device to enforce more
appropriate use of different levels of healthcare services. (3) The public health
insurance system generally does not cover outpatient visits and contributes lit-
tle to establish a price differential. As a result, all patients are inclined to visits
large hospitals regardless of the severity of illness, which causes overcrowding
in large hospitals and underutilization in smaller ones.
Despite lackluster development on the supply side, the demand for health
and health services is booming in China, driven by the growing middle class
and an aging population. The total number of annual hospital visits has tripled
from 2005 to 2014 (from 51.8 million to 153.7 million), and average hospital
revenue has increased almost five times during the same period (from 55.7
million to 273.4 million) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). A report by
the McKinsey Global Institute predicts that the healthcare spending in China
will reach 1 trillion USD by 2020, up from 350 billion in 2012 (Le Deu et al.,
2012). Facing this ever-growing demand, improving the healthcare delivery
workload for urban hospitals. Fourth, promote basic public health services. Fifth, launch
the pilot reform in public hospitals. See Chen (2009) for more detail.
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has become the top priority for both the government and the society as a
whole to ensure the most effective development of China’s healthcare system.
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TABLE C2
Comparing the Dynamic Response Between Adopting and Non-Adopting
Hospitals Before and After the Treatment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Total Visits Total Registrations
App−5 -0.001 -0.006
(0.032) (0.028)
App−4 -0.003 -0.003
(0.027) (0.026)
App−3 0.013 0.024
(0.030) (0.027)
App−2 0.008 0.022
(0.027) (0.024)
App−1 -0.014 0.015
(0.026) (0.023)
App1 0.020 0.057**
(0.026) (0.023)
App2 0.049 0.081***
(0.030) (0.026)
App3 0.017 0.052*
(0.031) (0.027)
App4 0.051* 0.086***
(0.030) (0.030)
App5 0.088*** 0.111***
(0.032) (0.035)
App6 0.085*** 0.129***
(0.031) (0.030)
Observations 28,013 28,013
R-squared 0.813 0.803
Notes: The table estimates the dynamic effect of the app on the hospital’s total visits and total registrations.
The regression specification is yit = α+
∑
Q β
QAppQit + λi + λt + it, where Q ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 6} where AppQ
is the dummy indicating the Qth quarter from the actual app launch. App1 is the dummy for the first three
months after the app launch, and App6 is the dummy for all subsequent months after the 6th quarter fol-
lowing the actual app launch. All quarterly lags and leads remain zero for control hospitals. All regressions
include hospital fixed effects, month fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at
the hospital-month level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C3
Robustness Analysis with Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Oﬄine
VARIABLES Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Subsample 1: Non-specialty Hospitals
App 0.077*** 0.014 -0.047*** -0.004 -0.068*** -0.047***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007)
Observations 25,592 25,592 25,592 25,592 25,592 25,592
R-squared 0.825 0.840 0.663 0.819 0.835 0.656
Subsample 2: Weekdays Observations
App 0.099*** 0.054*** -0.034*** 0.008 -0.041*** -0.037***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
Observations 21,232 21,232 21,232 21,232 21,232 21,232
R-squared 0.862 0.875 0.671 0.860 0.873 0.673
Subsample 3: Provincial Capital Hospitals
App 0.082*** 0.040*** -0.032*** 0.012 -0.028* -0.030***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
Observations 20,252 20,252 20,252 20,252 20,252 20,252
R-squared 0.805 0.812 0.369 0.800 0.807 0.375
Subsample 4: Balanced Panel Observations
App 0.087*** 0.054*** -0.024*** 0.002 -0.034** -0.027***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005)
Observations 25,126 25,126 25,126 25,126 25,126 25,126
R-squared 0.812 0.826 0.681 0.808 0.822 0.678
Subsample 5: Adopter Hospitals
App 0.164*** 0.108*** -0.041*** 0.065*** 0.006 -0.044***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 11,599 11,599 11,599 11,599 11,599 11,599
R-squared 0.847 0.871 0.657 0.844 0.870 0.659
Notes: The table checks the robustness of our benchmark results in Table 3.3 by re-estimating Equation 3.1
on different subsamples. Subsample 1 drops three specialty hospitals. Subsample 2 drops the weekend ob-
servations. Subsample 3 restricts the sample to hospitals in the provincial capital. Subsample 4 drops the
observations before September 3, 2013 to ensure a balanced panel. Subsample 5 restricts to only the adopt-
ing hospitals. All regressions include hospital fixed effects, month fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C4
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week (Part 1: Total)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
Panel A: Log Total Visits
DOW 0.229*** 0.127*** 0.070*** 0.039*** 0.046*** -0.306***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
App×DOW 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.105*** 0.131***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
App×Other 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.079***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.811 0.804 0.802 0.801 0.801 0.831
Panel B: Log Total Registrations
DOW 0.234*** 0.134*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.051*** -0.321***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011)
App×DOW 0.027 0.023 0.021 0.034** 0.058*** 0.088***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
App×Other 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.827 0.820 0.818 0.817 0.817 0.848
Panel C: Total Appointment Cancellation Rate
DOW 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App×DOW -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
App×Other -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.663 0.664 0.669
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithmic of total visits, total registrations, and total cancellation rate
respectively in Panels (A) to (C). Independent variable DOW is dummy for a given day of the week, and
Other is dummy for other days of the week. All regressions include the hospital fixed effects, month fixed ef-
fects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses:
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C5
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week (Part 2: Oﬄine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
Panel D: Log Oﬄine Visits
DOW 0.229*** 0.127*** 0.070*** 0.039*** 0.046*** -0.306***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
App×DOW -0.016 -0.022 -0.015 -0.014 0.011 0.045**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
App×Other 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.004 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.807 0.800 0.798 0.797 0.797 0.828
Panel E: Log Oﬄine Registrations
DOW 0.234*** 0.134*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.051*** -0.321***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011)
App×DOW -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.041*** 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
App×Other -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.062***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.824 0.817 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.845
Panel F: Oﬄine Appointment Cancellation Rate
DOW 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App×DOW -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
App×Other -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.038***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.663 0.663 0.664 0.669
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithmic of oﬄine visits, oﬄine registrations, and oﬄine cancellation rate,
respectively, in Panels (D) to (F). Independent variable DOW is dummy for a given day of the week, and
Other is dummy for other days of the week. All regressions include hospital fixed effects, month fixed ef-
fects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses:
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C6
Reduction in Waiting Time by Days of the Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
DOW 1.096*** -0.092 0.962*** 1.368*** 0.592*** -3.300***
(0.139) (0.151) (0.157) (0.145) (0.142) (0.122)
New ×DOW -2.081*** -2.022*** -2.441*** -2.737*** -2.882*** -3.440***
(0.153) (0.167) (0.165) (0.164) (0.157) (0.140)
New ×Other -2.771*** -2.771*** -2.693*** -2.637*** -2.613*** -2.404***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.133)
Observations 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
Individuals 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909
Year and Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Dependent variables are waiting time on mobile waiting list measured in hours. Independent variable
“New” measures the number of new apps adopted in the same city since the individual’s first appearance in
the sample. DOW is the day of the week dummy for Monday to Friday and weekends, respectively, from
Columns (1) to (6). Other is the dummy for days of the week other than DOW. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C7
Heterogeneous Effect by Hospital Tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Oﬄine
VARIABLES Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
App× TierTwo 0.094*** 0.085*** -0.007 0.007 -0.012 -0.015***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) (0.005)
App× TierThree 0.095*** 0.008 -0.064*** 0.003 -0.080*** -0.060***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.801 0.817 0.676 0.797 0.813 0.671
Hospitals 22 22 22 22 22 22
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Dependent variables are log total visits, log total registrations, and total cancellation rate in Columns
(1) to (3), and log oﬄine visits, log oﬄine registrations, and oﬄine cancellation rate in Columns (4) to (6).
App is the dummy that switches to one after the app is launched in treatment hospitals. TierThree and
TierTwo are the dummies for tier-three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C8
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week and by Hospital Tier
(Part 1: Total and Oﬄine Visits)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
Panel A: Log Total Visits
DOW × TierTwo 0.162*** 0.057*** 0.009*** -0.013*** 0.010** -0.136***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
DOW × TierThree 0.350*** 0.252*** 0.179*** 0.134*** 0.111*** -0.616***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019)
DOW × TierTwo×App 0.108*** 0.117*** 0.085*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.053**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)
DOW × TierThree×App 0.004 -0.023 0.020 0.005 0.066*** 0.297***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029)
Other × TierTwo×App 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.109***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Other × TierThree×App 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.014
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.813 0.805 0.803 0.802 0.802 0.846
Panel B: Log Oﬄine Visits
DOW × TierTwo 0.162*** 0.057*** 0.009*** -0.013*** 0.010** -0.136***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
DOW × TierThree 0.350*** 0.253*** 0.179*** 0.134*** 0.111*** -0.616***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019)
DOW × TierTwo×App 0.016 0.023 0.006 0.022 0.024 -0.021
(0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023)
DOW × TierThree×App -0.087*** -0.110*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.022 0.194***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030)
Other × TierTwo×App 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Other × TierThree×App 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.007 -0.075***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.809 0.801 0.799 0.798 0.798 0.844
Notes: Dependent variables are log total visits in Panel (A) and log oﬄine visits in Panel (B). DOW is the
dummy for a given day of the week, i.e. Monday to Friday and weekends, respectively, from Columns (1)
to (6). Other is the dummy for days of the week other than DOW . App is the dummy that switches to
one after the app is launched in treatment hospitals. TierThree and TierTwo are the dummies for tier-
three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. All regressions include the hospital fixed effects, month fixed ef-
fects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses:
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C9
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week and by Hospital Tier
(Part 2: Total and Oﬄine Registrations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
Panel A: Log Total Registrations
DOW × TierTwo 0.172*** 0.068*** 0.016*** -0.009** 0.015*** -0.158***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
DOW × TierThree 0.347*** 0.253*** 0.179*** 0.132*** 0.117*** -0.617***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018)
DOW × TierTwo×App 0.094*** 0.104*** 0.072*** 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.049**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
DOW × TierThree×App -0.081*** -0.105*** -0.066*** -0.078*** -0.025 0.206***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
Other × TierTwo×App 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.098***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Other × TierThree×App 0.023 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.014 -0.072***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.828 0.821 0.819 0.818 0.818 0.861
Panel B: Log Oﬄine Registrations
DOW × TierTwo 0.172*** 0.068*** 0.016*** -0.009** 0.015*** -0.158***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
DOW × TierThree 0.347*** 0.253*** 0.179*** 0.132*** 0.117*** -0.617***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018)
DOW × TierTwo×App -0.009 -0.003 -0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.030
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022)
DOW × TierThree×App -0.167*** -0.187*** -0.151*** -0.162*** -0.108*** 0.108***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027)
Other × TierTwo×App -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Other × TierThree×App -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.075*** -0.156***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.825 0.818 0.815 0.814 0.814 0.859
Notes: Dependent variables are log total registrations in Panel (A) and log oﬄine registrations in Panel (B).
DOW is the dummy for a given day of the week, i.e. Monday to Friday and weekends, respectively, from
Columns (1) to (6). Other is the dummy for days of the week other than DOW . App is the dummy that
switches to one after the app is launched in treatment hospitals. TierThree and TierTwo are the dummies
for tier-three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. All regressions include the hospital fixed effects, month
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are in
parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C10
Heterogeneous Effect by Days of the Week and by Hospital Tier
(Part 3: Total and Oﬄine Cancellation Rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
Panel A: Log Total Cancellation Rate
DOW × TierTwo 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOW × TierThree -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002** 0.005*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOW × TierTwo×App -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.005 -0.007 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
DOW × TierThree×App -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Other × TierTwo×App -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Other × TierThree×App -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.063***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.677 0.677 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.684
Panel B: Log Oﬄine Cancellation Rate
DOW × TierTwo 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOW × TierThree -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002** 0.005*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOW × TierTwo×App -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
DOW × TierThree×App -0.060*** -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Other × TierTwo×App -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Other × TierThree×App -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.059***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.672 0.672 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.679
Notes: Dependent variables are log total cancellation rate in Panel (A) and log oﬄine cancellation rate in
Panel (B). DOW is the dummy for a given day of the week, i.e. Monday to Friday and weekends, respec-
tively, from Columns (1) to (6). Other is the dummy for days of the week other than DOW . App is the
dummy that switches to one after the app is launched in treatment hospitals. TierThree and TierTwo are
the dummies for tier-three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. All regressions include hospital fixed effects,
month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month level are
in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C11
Reduction in Waiting Time by Hospital Tier and by Days of the Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Weekends
DOW 1.092*** -0.101 0.958*** 1.363*** 0.601*** -3.310***
(0.139) (0.151) (0.157) (0.145) (0.142) (0.122)
NewTierTwo ×DOW -5.392*** -4.575*** -4.445*** -5.654*** -5.858*** -4.329***
(0.267) (0.274) (0.301) (0.280) (0.279) (0.228)
NewTierThree ×DOW 0.571** 0.044 -0.839*** -0.371 -0.464* -2.813***
(0.251) (0.275) (0.283) (0.275) (0.269) (0.230)
NewTierTwo ×Other -4.974*** -5.155*** -5.170*** -4.959*** -4.937*** -5.194***
(0.202) (0.202) (0.201) (0.201) (0.202) (0.209)
NewTierThree ×Other -0.994*** -0.846*** -0.688*** -0.762*** -0.740*** -0.143
(0.195) (0.193) (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) (0.202)
Observations 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283 1,705,283
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
Number of Individuals 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909 278,909
Year and Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Dependent variables are waiting time on mobile waiting list measured in hours. NewTierTwo measures
the number of new apps adopted by tier-two hospitals, and NewTierThree measures the number of new apps
adopted by tier-three hospitals. DOW is the dummy for a given day of the week, i.e. Monday to Friday and
weekends, respectively, from Columns (1) to (6). Other is the dummy for days of the week other than DOW .
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C12
Reduction in Waiting Time by Hospital Tier
(1) (2)
Waiting Time (hrs) Waiting Time (hrs)
New -2.654***
(0.128)
NewTierTwo -5.067***
(0.200)
NewTierThree -0.705***
(0.192)
Observations 1,705,283 1,705,283
R-squared 0.008 0.008
Number of Individuals 278,909 278,909
Year and Month FE YES YES
City FE YES YES
Individual FE YES YES
Notes: Dependent variables are waiting time on mobile waiting list measured in hours. Independent variable
“New” measures the number of new apps adopted in the same city since the individual’s first appearance in
the sample. NewTierTwo measures the number of new apps adopted by tier-two hospitals, and NewTierThree
measures the number of new apps adopted by tier-three hospitals. Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C13
Heterogeneous Effect by Hospital Tier and by Type of Departments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Oﬄine
VARIABLES Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Panel A: Departments for Less Severe Conditions
App× TierTwo 0.156*** 0.142*** -0.011*** 0.069*** 0.046** -0.019***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.004)
App× TierThree 0.045*** 0.028** -0.016*** -0.043** -0.059*** -0.016***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017) (0.016) (0.004)
Observations 28,085 28,085 28,085 28,085 28,085 28,085
R-squared 0.846 0.848 0.532 0.843 0.845 0.526
Panel B: Departments for More Severe Conditions
App× TierTwo 0.009 -0.050 -0.043*** -0.008 -0.069 -0.045***
(0.053) (0.048) (0.009) (0.052) (0.047) (0.009)
App× TierThree 0.189*** 0.124*** -0.050*** 0.146*** 0.082*** -0.049***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.008) (0.025) (0.022) (0.008)
Observations 25,509 25,509 25,509 25,509 25,509 25,509
R-squared 0.865 0.870 0.693 0.866 0.870 0.689
Notes: Panel A presents results for less severe departments, including health promotion, rehabilitation, nu-
trition, Chinese medicine, ophthalmology, otolaryngology, dermatology, and dentistry. Panel B presents re-
sults for more severe departments, including endocrinology, cardiology, respiration, urology, cardiothoracic
surgery, and orthopedics. App is the dummy that switches to one after the app is launched in treatment
hospitals. TierThree and TierTwo are the dummies for tier-three and tier-two hospitals, respectively. All
regressions include hospital fixed effects, month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the hospital-month level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE C14
Heterogeneous Effect by Age Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Oﬄine
VARIABLES Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Visits Registrations Cancellation
Rate
Panel A: Age below 20
App 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.004* 0.028 0.029 0.000
(0.021) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.020) (0.002)
Observations 29,728 29,728 29,728 29,728 29,728 29,728
R-squared 0.846 0.855 0.649 0.846 0.854 0.650
Panel B: Age between 20 to 40
App 0.105*** 0.071*** -0.024*** -0.007 -0.043*** -0.027***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
Observations 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731 29,731
R-squared 0.827 0.837 0.739 0.824 0.835 0.737
Panel C: Age between 40 to 60
App 0.057*** 0.016 -0.032*** 0.024** -0.018* -0.033***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
Observations 29,727 29,727 29,727 29,727 29,727 29,727
R-squared 0.770 0.780 0.716 0.775 0.784 0.715
Panel D: Age above 60
App 0.083*** 0.041*** -0.031*** 0.056*** 0.017 -0.032***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 29,717 29,717 29,717 29,717 29,717 29,717
R-squared 0.783 0.790 0.627 0.784 0.792 0.626
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithmic of total visits, total registrations, and total cancellation rates
respectively in Columns (1) to (3), and logarithmic of oﬄine visits, oﬄine registrations and oﬄine cancel-
lation rates in Columns (4) to (6). Panel A is for patients aged below 20, Panel B for age between 20 and
40, Panel C for age between 40 and 60; and Panel D for age above 60. All regressions include hospital fixed
effects, month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital-month
level are in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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